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ABSTRACT

Melvin J. Maas was a Marine Corps officer, combat pilot, and member of
Congress. Maas’s unique view of American defense in the Interwar Period led him to
promote the modernization of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve, which resulted in the
formation of a well trained pool of semi-professional personnel prior to the outbreak of
the Second World War. This study first examines the evolution of the formation of the
reserve system of the American Armed Forces during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, in order to understand the state of the Marine Corps Reserve that Maas joined
in 1925. As a marine reservist and a Representative from Minnesota, Maas was able to
identify key areas for improvement within the Marine Reserve, Naval Reserve, and
eventually the reserves of all the branches of the American military. With Maas as its
focus, this analysis of the changing reserve system shows the importance he had on
modernizing the Marine Corps Reserve, thereby greatly enhancing the ability of the
Marine Corps to mobilize in both 1940 and 1950. Maas’s direct alterations to the Navy
and Marine Corps reserve system were essential to the creation of the modern reserve
policies of all of the American Armed Forces, and thus aided greatly in improving the US
defense structure after the Second World War. The primary sources consulted for this
study include letters, journals, and other pertinent material from the Melvin J. Maas
Collection located at the Minnesota State Archives in St. Paul and Congressional Records
located at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

On a January morning in 1929, a man piloted his single seat attack aircraft above
Washington D.C. As the wind howled past, the man, frustrated with the leadership of his
nation, focused his gaze upon the Capitol Building as it came into view. Aware that
President Herbert Hoover was presiding over a joint session of Congress, the pilot
directed his approach in order to conduct a bombing run on the gathering that included
the Chief Executive, the Cabinet, the two Houses of Congress, and the members of the
Supreme Court. With no air defenses in place, the aircraft sailed toward its target
unmolested. The pilot accelerated and pointed the nose of the machine at the skylights of
the House, ensuring that his payload would affect the objective in the most catastrophic
way possible. But, once his target neared, the pilot pulled back on his controls, narrowly
avoiding crashing into the building. The faux surprise attack rocked by the Capitol,
sending panicked representatives and senators racing for cover. However, as quickly as
the event occurred, the plane was gone. No explosions. No casualties. The only damage
left in the plane's wake were rattled windows and shaken legislators. Had the attacker
somehow missed his intended target? Had there been some kind of weapons system
malfunction? Neither. The pilot had executed a textbook bombing run and the weapons
systems functioned perfectly, but no payload was dropped because the plane was not
armed.
The pilot of the aircraft was not a crazed terrorist bent on a strike to decapitate the
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American government, but rather a member of Congress himself. Extremely frustrated
with his fellow legislators’ lack of interest in American airpower, Representative Melvin
J. Maas of Minnesota, a World War I veteran and member of the Marine Corps Reserve,
believed that the only way to make his colleagues sit up and take notice of the destructive
qualities aircraft represented was to stage a faux attack upon the Capitol. Maas’s action
helped change the minds of many of his contemporaries, but it also put him at odds,
temporarily, with his commanding officers within the Marine Corps. Yet, the risk the
stunt posed to his career within the Marine Corps pales in comparison to his passion
about American defense, and the importance airpower had to its future.
Although Maas fought for broadening American airpower, there was another
aspect of defense that this maverick from Minnesota would champion above all else: the
continual improvement of the United States Marine Corps Reserve, an organization that
he would be a part of for the majority of his life. Maas's dual role as a member of the
House of Representatives and a Marine Corps Reserve officer gave him a unique insight
into the plight of reservists during the Interwar Period (1919-1941). He employed this
insight to continually shape the Marine and Navy Reserve programs, and his efforts
eventually spilled over to the reserve forces of the entire American Armed Forces. The
policies he created modernized the reserve forces, a core tenant of the post-World War II
defense structure. Thus, he is partially responsible for strengthening the United States'
ability to wage war in the latter half of the twentieth century. However, much like his
faux bombing run against the Capitol in 1929, Maas has been generally forgotten.
Maas’s efforts to modernize the Marine Corps Reserve during the Interwar Period
are greatly overshadowed by the Marine Corps’ successful efforts to improve amphibious
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operations during the same time span. The perseverance of famous marines like Victor
"Brute" Krulack and Holland "Howling Mad" Smith helped to not only unravel the
difficulties presented by the Gallipoli Campaign but also created a definable niche for the
Marine Corps within American defense.1 Their efforts led to a military innovation that
was heralded by General Dwight Eisenhower as the key to Allied Victory in both Europe
and the Pacific.2 However, during the same period, the Marine Corps also evolved their
Reserves from an underpaid, under-trained, and under-equipped force into a modernized
organization that became the model for all branches of the American Armed Forces in the
years following the Second World War. This transformation significantly strengthened
the Marine Corps during the Pacific War and the Korean Conflict, and made the
prolonged conflicts of the War on Terror possible. Yet, unlike the development of
amphibious operations, the development of the modern Marine Corps Reserves receives
very little scholarly attention, and the man responsible, Melvin J. Maas, even less.
Maas's continual efforts throughout the Interwar Period as a Congressman and as
a Marine officer helped to reinforce the service’s very foundation. His devotion to his
chosen service and his rise in legislative influence made him an asset to the Marine
Corps. Maas was a product of the Corps, and in return he helped produce a reserve force
befitting its parent organization. The Marine Corps Reserve that Maas helped evolve
aided in the service's efforts to secure permanence within the Department of Defense,

1

Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1984), 71-100. Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass, (New York: C.
Scribner's Sons, 1949), 59-79.

2

G. W. Keiser, The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47: The Politics of Survival
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), 3-4.

4
became a critical component of the modern Marine Corps, and shaped the entire reserve
system of the American military.
Military reserves are an essential aspect of modern militaries.3 Reserve
components provide a flexibility to the projection of potential military might. A well
organized military reserve essentially allows nations to mobilize military forces in sizes
that would be fiscally impossible to retain on active duty during peacetime. This
flexibility is the central reason for the creation of reserve systems, yet is by no means the
only benefit. Reserves, if properly managed, serve a number of functions for military
organizations. First of all, they provide a way to retain active duty veterans after the
completion of their contracts. These veterans, typically serving as either officers and
noncommissioned officers within reserve units, provide a great deal of guidance to the
companies to which they are assigned. In addition, the reserves offer an opportunity for
those interested in enlisting but not prepared to leave their civilian pursuits to devote
themselves to a period of active service. Many times these individuals are enrolled in
higher education and, upon achieving their scholarly endeavors, decide to become active
duty officers. In this respect, the reserves serve as a way to both recruit and train officers
for regular service.
Once activated, reserve forces greatly increase the size of their parent force.
However, in the case of the Marine Corps during World War II and Korea, the reserves
provided an initial surge followed by increasing numbers of new recruits. The newly
augmented Marine Corps was able to integrate these large numbers of new marines into
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units that were composed of both regulars and reservists who had served in the Corps for
numerous years. This allowed for the pre-war and wartime structure to grow rapidly in
size while retaining a high level of professionalism and esprit de corps. The ability to
quickly increase the size of a given military force with a reserve component has since
become a vital aspect in strategic planning.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the need for reserve forces within the
American Armed Forces became apparent. As the branches of service became
increasingly professionalized and wars for westward expansion came to a close, a shift in
the approach to strategic affairs took place. Senior military leadership began looking
outward toward potential military conflicts with foreign nations. With the possibility of
various conflicts breaking out, the military needed to widen its potential pool of
servicemen. Confined by a limited military budget, the reserves became an optimal way
to gain the flexibility required to adequately prepare for a multitude of possible military
confrontations. While the need for reserve forces was evident, and their creation a reality
within the opening decades of the twentieth century, the management and maintenance of
them was not keenly developed.4
Marines participated in the reserves on a volunteer basis and their access to
training opportunities, pay, and treatment greatly affected participation and retention
levels. The War Department and the Department of the Navy formed their initial reserve
systems independently, with the War Department overseeing the Army Reserve and
National Guard, and the Department of the Navy managing the Navy and Marine Corps
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Reserves. The earliest forms of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves were in
place in the years preceding American entry into the First World War, and each was
called upon to bolster the Armed Services. Even though the Navy and War Departments
benefited from increased support both before and during the conflict, interest in military
affairs began to wane shortly after victory was declared. With the respective departments
dealing with the loss of both popular and economic support, the maintenance of the
newly formed reserve systems began to falter. Without strong support within the top
levels of leadership, the early reserve systems of the American Armed Forces were in
danger of devolving into uselessness.
It was primarily through the efforts of Congressman and Marine Reserve officer
Melvin J. Maas, who dedicated his entire life to ensuring that the Marine Corps Reserve
remained a viable force during the lean years separating the World Wars, that prevented
this from happening. Maas's initial training as a recruit in 1917 instilled an intense
devotion to the service. Upon the completion of his active duty contract, he was the ideal
candidate for the Marine Corps Reserve: a veteran, a promising NCO, and interested in
becoming an officer. Yet, Maas was to be more than an outstanding officer who was
willing to be called into service in the defense of his nation. He was also a member of the
House of Representatives. Contravening the American military tradition of officers
refraining from participating in politics, Maas, as a reservist, was able to fight for the
interests of the Navy and Marine Corps, all while donning his uniform on a regular basis.
Throughout his career, Maas gained influence within Congress as he served on
various military committees. In addition, he formed a special interest group, the Marine
Corps Reserve Officers Association (MCROA), in order to increase his political clout.
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This combined leverage allowed Maas to alter legislation that directly affected the
Marine Corps Reserve. As an active reservist, he had a firsthand understanding of the of
Marine Reserve, specifically in terms of some of the difficulties its members experienced.
With such intimate knowledge of the plight of early reservists, the legislation that Maas
helped to pass prior to 1940 succeeded in making it the pool of highly trained, dedicated,
and professional personnel it was originally intended to be. This transformation of the
reserves proved to be a vital aspect of naval service during World War II.
Over 60% of all marines assigned to the Pacific War were reservists. They fought
and died in every engagement in which the Marine Corps participated during the course
of the conflict. Their amalgamation into the Fleet Marine Force in 1940 allowed the
Corps to more effectively manage the influx of new marines throughout the course of the
Second World War. Their contribution significantly affected the trajectory of the Marine
Corps from 1941 to 1945. Yet, the Marine Corps Reserve and Maas are left out of much
of Marine Corps history.
Soldiers of the Sea by Col. Robert Debs Heinl. Jr., one of the most comprehensive
histories of the Marine Corps through 1965, mentions the Marine Corps Reserve a total
of only seven times. Maas receives even less attention, mentioned only for his efforts to
defend the Marine Corps against attempts to dissolve the force in the early 1930’s.5 Heinl
fails to recognize Maas’s legislative efforts to improve the Marine Corps Reserve, or
those of anyone else. Like the majority of Marine Corps historians, he focuses on the
Corps’ illustrious history, its colorful culture, and its mythos, which is unlike any other
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branch of the American Armed Forces. Unfortunately in Heinl’s work, and in many other
treatments of Marine Corps history, the Corps’ reserve component is either mentioned
sporadically or entirely omitted.6
The Marine Corps Reserve has published its own official history that details its
origins and advancements through 1966.7 This work identifies Maas’s contributions to
the service, and even goes as far as dedicating the book to him. However, even in this
specific history of the Reserves, the focus remains on the development of the
organization as a military entity and the experiences of reservists at different times. The
book fails to include a number of important pieces of legislation passed by Maas and the
motivations behind much of his efforts. Furthermore, it only briefly touches upon Maas’s
career as reserve officers, which shaped his congressional attempts to improve the
reserves.
Melvin J. Maas: Gallant Man of Action, by Gladys Zehnpfening, is the only
historical work that focuses solely on Melvin Maas.8 This biography, originally published
in 1967, examines Maas’s life in depth and is part of a series entitled Men of
Achievement. The stated target audience for this series is “high school students who may
soon be entering the armed forces.”9 While Zehnpfening presents a readable account of
Maas’s life, her writing lacks a broader exploration of his impact upon the larger
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American defense structure. Zehnpfening also leaves out key events, like the pistol range
accident that nearly ended Maas’s life, resulting in an incomplete narrative. Furthermore,
the author spends a great deal of time discussing Maas’s personal life outside of politics
and the Marine Corps. While interesting, these details are not relevant to his impact on
the American military’s reserve systems, nor his involvement with the debate over the
reorganization of American defense in postwar era.
In 1944, Maas engaged in the opening debates surrounding the unification of the
War Department and the Navy Department into a single department. Within the context
of these debates, the future role of the Marine Corps was called into question, and in
some instances the service’s survival was in jeopardy. These ongoing debates eventually
culminated in the National Security Act of 1947, the creation of the Department of
Defense, and a future for the Marine Corps.10 The debate over defense reorganization has
been examined from the perspectives of the politics surrounding the controversy, as well
as the individual services’ experiences between 1944-1947.11 Maas’s contributions during
this time are sometimes mentioned, but are more often omitted. Even in a book
specifically dedicated to the Marine Corps’ experiences during the unification debate,
Maas’s efforts are not fully explored.12
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Maas is directly responsible for the survival and modernization of the Marine
Corps Reserve, and his devotion to the organization led to the strengthening of the entire
Marine Corps in the critical years preceding the war against Japan. He therefore deserves
greater attention in the historiography. The advantages gained by the Marines’
employment of a modernized reserve in the lead up to hostilities helped dictate the tempo
of the Pacific War. The participation of a vast number of marine reservists between 19401945 helped the Marine Corps win the now iconic battles they took part in like
Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. These hard fought battles required the ultimate
sacrifice of active duty and reservist marines alike and became the foundation of the
Marine Corps’ bid for a place within postwar defense. This is illustrated most
dramatically in Commandant Vandergrift’s famous testimony before Congress on May 6,
1946. Vandergrift stated: “The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine
as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go.
But I think you will agree with me that he has earned the right to depart with dignity and
honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness and servility planned for him by the
War Department.” The Commandant’s words became known as the “Bended Knee
Speech,” and his delivery of them became the embodiment of the Corps’ resolve.13
The Marine Corps Reserves initially proved its value during the Second World
War and again during the Korean War. Maas and his political allies developed the
organization to such a degree that it became the template for the reserve affairs for all
branches of the military, thus creating the modern reserve system. Today the reserves of
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the American Armed Forces constitute a sizable portion of American military might and
allow for prolonged conflicts to be feasible as they provide for a steady rotation of units
in and out of theater. Maas and the reserve system he largely constructed represent a vital
aspect of twentieth century American military history—an aspect that deserves to be
integrated into the larger narrative.
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CHAPTER TWO: AMERICAN MILITIAS
AND THE NEED FOR A MODERN RESERVE SYSTEM

An examination of the Marine Corps Reserve and an appreciation of the
contributions of Melvin Maas cannot be fully realized without a comprehensive
understanding of American militias and their eventual transformation into reserves. This
chapter examines the cultural origins of the American militias, the identification of the
need for federally controlled military reserves, and the War and Navy Departments’
independent establishment of reserve forces.
Prior to the twentieth century, the armed forces of the United States relied heavily
on state-run militias. This dispersed force solved key political issues and conflicts that
existed during the early years of the Republic. First, the United States did not have to
maintain a large professional army. This allowed for less federal expenditures on defense.
More importantly, it prevented the possible use of a large standing army to impose the
will of the federal government upon the states and their populations. Secondly, the early
militia system created a sense of personal investment in the defense of both the nation
and local governments. This is in stark contrast to European systems in which the
military was a tool of the state, its ranks filled with those often pressed into service, and
used for both external and internal expressions of power. Thirdly, the militia system
allowed for a continuation of the venerated tradition of a civilian based military—a
military force that upon its inception was able to secure victory over one of the most
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powerful standing armies in the world—the English. Maintaining the militia system
remained crucial in the formation of a uniquely American military identity.14
However, the American public’s mistrust of a standing army during its formative
years did not prevent the United States from maintaining one after the Revolutionary
War. Yet with little interest in the expansion of military capabilities during peacetime,
American defense turned to the militia system to augment this standing army when it
found itself entangled in conflicts such as the War of 1812 and the Mexican American
War. Throughout each successive conflict, the militia forces of the United States made
slight improvements. Nevertheless, key problems persisted. The War Department's lack
of control over the various state-run militias created both logistical and tactical problems
for the Army. Internal leadership, rank structure, and promotion systems of the militias
lacked uniformity often causing a reduction of professionalism and effectiveness. In
addition, state militias had difficulty ensuring that they could muster all of those who had
volunteered when the units were called into service. The reliability of the state produced
forces was less than ideal for the War Department's strategy makers as well as for regular
army generals who employed them in the field. As the nineteenth century continued, the
regular forces of the United States military continued to improve at a greater rate than
their militia counterparts.15
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The modernization of the American Armed Forces impacted everything from
uniforms and equipment to administration and professionalism. Both the War Department
and the Navy Department worked to increase their budgets, sizes, and roles as the nation
expanded westward. Up until the Spanish American War, the nation's defense planning
was mainly based on reactionary strategy development and continued to rely on state-run
militias to fill any personnel shortfalls that might present themselves upon the outbreak of
an armed conflict. However, as the nation and its military matured, it became
increasingly evident that each of the armed services needed to reorient themselves into
more streamlined, flexible, and centrally controlled entities. These changes came in a
number of different initiatives, but one of the most important was the decline of the
reliance on state-run militias and the rise of the reserve systems within both the War and
Navy Departments. Although these changes happened independently, they constituted the
beginnings of a critical shift in the professionalism of the armed forces and created an
expansion of military power.16
Upon victory over Spain in the Spanish American War, Secretary of War Elihu
Root engaged in sweeping reforms that had reverberating effects throughout the first half
of the twentieth century. Root, set on increasing the War Department's power, identified
key deficiencies in the organization of the department. Between 1903 and 1908, Root
altered the structure of the War Department to be more efficient. His efforts are
collectively known as the Root Reforms.17
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The Root Reforms were a crucial turning point in the strategic mentality of
American defense. Secretary Root sought to increase the power of the War Department
by altering the internal management of the organization. Up until 1903, the logistical
management of the United States Army, including the Quartermaster's Corps and the
Paymaster's Corps, fell under the direction of the Secretary of War. This meant that a
portion of the most critical aspects of military administration were under the direction of
civilian leadership, essentially splitting the management of the Army in half. While the
General-in-chief of the Army maintained control over the Army's operations during both
peacetime and war, his lack of control over the administrative aspects functionally
hindered his ability to further modernize the force.18 Furthermore, this split in
management generated difficulties in the creation of forward-looking strategy as the
upper echelon of Army leadership lacked the control needed to properly prepare for
possible large scale deployments.
Under the Root Reforms, these key issues of management were resolved by
combining the various administrative corps and medical corps into two distinct entities all
under the leadership of the Chief of Staff of the Army. This resolved a number of issues
including the ability to properly plan for potential conflicts. However, the Root Act went
beyond solving organizational problems that made military planning difficult. It also
established an internal board of senior Army leadership responsible for improved
methods of strategic development. This board, which became the first inception of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, marked the first instance in which American military leadership
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could be proactive toward potential conflicts beyond the continental United States. For
the first time in its history, American strategy makers began officially formulating
various hypothetical war plans. These efforts to plan for potential wars spawned the need
for the rapid mobilization of well-trained troops under the direct control of the War
Department. Before the Root Reforms, neither the War Department or the Navy
Department possessed this critical reserve aspect for contingent war planning.19
While the Root Reforms focused on improving the War Department's ability to
internally manage itself and create future strategy, a separate piece of legislation, the
Dick Act, ensured that American defense had a centrally controlled reserve force.
Sponsored by Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio, the purpose of the act was to solve the
issues of irregularity that hindered the aging American militia system.20 Up until the Dick
Act of 1903, militias were under the complete control of the states in which they
originated—an aspect that was central to American military identity. The Dick Act
solved a number of the issues of the militia system by dissolving the individual militia
units into a single entity, the National Guard. Although units within the National Guard
were still controlled by the governors of the states in which they originated, the War
Department could now require these units to maintain the same training, equipment, and
rank structure as the regular Army. In addition to reforming the militias, the Dick Act
also established an Army Reserve under the sole control of the War Department. This
dualistic approach allowed the Army to solve many of the issues that had encumbered the
militia system that had been in place throughout the nineteenth century while keeping the
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spirit of the state-run armed forces intact. The new reserve component created by the
Dick Act brought forth a section of the Army that provided trained citizen-soldiers
directly under the control of the War Department.21
The cumulative effect of the Root Reforms and the Dick Act was to modernize
the War Department and reorient it to better deal with a more globally minded approach
to military affairs. The establishment of the Chiefs of Staff meant that the War
Department could take a more pragmatic approach to planning for potential international
conflict. However these hypothetical war plans were heavily reliant upon having access
to an additional pool of well-trained men who could be mobilized rapidly. With the Army
Reserve and National Guard, military planners now had flexibility for reacting to the
possibility of war within the changing international political scene of the twentieth
century.
The Root Reforms thus mark an important inflection point for three main reasons.
First, the War Department's improved internal management increased the department's
power by enhancing its efficiency to self-manage. Second, the Root Reforms provided
the Army with an established institution for long-range military planning. Third, the
reserves constituted a cost effective and flexible approach to the problem of fielding welltrained manpower in the event of large scale conflict. Moreover, these changes
constituted a major shift away from the original concept of American defense, one reliant
upon a somewhat small army augmented by the state-run militias to a defense
establishment that continued to grow in both power and scope throughout the twentieth
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century. As America's ability to wage war improved, the reserves forces became a crucial
aspect of the nation's ascension to global power.
The Root Reforms and the Dick Act did not directly affect the Navy, and thus the
Navy’s experiences with militias and reserves differs from the Army's.22 Naval militias
existed in the Revolutionary War and in the War of 1812, however these forces were not
federally mandated and lacked the Navy's supervision.23 Nevertheless, senior naval
leadership was well aware of the strategic benefits of maintaining a reserve component.
In fact, the Navy's proposal for a reserve force pre-dates the Army's by nearly fourteen
years. In a letter written in 1889, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Admiral J. G.
Walker, wrote Secretary of the Navy Benjamin J. Tracy regarding the need for the
creation of a Naval Reserve: “At the present no means exists for providing the fleet with
a single trained man, beyond the number prescribed by law for the peace establishment,
and it would seem that no argument should be necessary to secure the required legislative
authority.”24 Admiral Walker also expounded upon how the reserves would be
implemented: “The study of the energy of maritime nations is being devoted to placing
the reserves of men, as well as materials in such a state of training and readiness as to
make them available for effective service on a 24 hour notice.”25 In this same letter,
Admiral Walker further clarified his position concerning the necessity of forming a pool
of semi-professional sailors in order for the U.S. Navy to remain current with other
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international powers: "Rapid mobilization may be said to be the leading naval question of
the day, and the current naval maneuvers abroad have given occasion of the frequent
statement of opinion that the readiness of ships and guns must be joined in equal
readiness of men to make any system of mobilization complete and effective."26 The
Admiral’s letter suggests that naval leadership recognized that without an established
means for a dynamic approach to manpower, the U.S. Navy could not adequately
compete on the global stage.
The letter also illuminates the Admiral’s position that it behooved the Secretary of
the Navy to take advantage of the favorable political climate to create a reserve force,
rather than a federally mandated naval militia: "It would be most unfortunate for the
Navy and for coastal defense should Congress fail to take advantage of public opinion on
the subject of creating a naval reserve and pass an act to encourage, utilize, and bind
together the State and individual effort, which has been made and is being made toward
this end."27
Admiral Walker's concept for a ready reserve of men trained for naval service
under the control of the Department of the Navy failed to gain enough interest or political
traction in either 1889 or 1890. This early failure can be attributed to the states'
unwillingness to create militia-like systems that they could not control. However,
Secretary of the Navy Tracy, favorable to Admiral Walker's ideas, helped to allocate
funds for the initial foundations of what would eventually become the Naval and Marine
Corps Reserve of the twentieth century. Within the Naval Appropriations Act of 1892,
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Tracy aided in the drafting of the following section, officially creating state-run naval
militias: "For arms and equipment connected therewith for naval militia of various States,
under such regulation as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe, $25,000."28 These state
run militias, as opposed to a reserve force under the control of the Navy Department,
were a more feasible political option during the late nineteenth century and the
appropriations bill passed with little argument in both the House and the Senate.
The naval militia was a far smaller aspect to naval defense when compared to the
land-based militias used by the War Department. The requirement of access to ports
precluded inland states from having naval militias. In addition, the technical know-how
needed to proficiently man an oceangoing vessel of war limited the pool of potential
participants. State-run naval militias required a greater investment of state budgets,
causing them to be relatively small in number. These naval forces also suffered from the
aforementioned issues of logistical uniformity, irregular promotion systems, and the
failure of members to report when called into service.
These issues meant that the Department of the Navy relied less upon state militias
than the War Department. It is therefore clear that by the close of the nineteenth century
the inherent problems of a citizen-based military became apparent to both the Navy and
War Departments. The War Department eventually solved many of these initial problems
with the Root Reforms in 1903, but the Navy was not able to do so until shortly before
American entry into the First World War.
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Admiral Walker's vision of a pool of trained men as a reserve force under the sole
control of the Navy, as put forward originally in 1889 and somewhat realized with the
creation of seaborne militias in 1892, remained a goal of naval leadership. In a 1900
letter, Lt. Commander William H. Southerland, Officer in Charge of the Naval Militia
Office, stated: "I call your attention to these facts to show the absolute necessity for the
creation, in addition to the naval militia organizations, of a government or national
reserve force, which should be organized entirely under the control of the Navy
Department."29
The Navy Department continued to stress the overwhelming need for this reserve
force, yet its ability to establish one continued to be hampered politically. Despite the
War Department’s ability to establish its control over militias shortly after the Spanish
American War, high ranking naval officials, eager to modernize and increase their forces
through a reserve system, still struggled to do so until the years preceding the outbreak of
the First World War. This is demonstrated by the following statement by Secretary of the
Navy, George V. L. Meyer in 1906: "In every foreign country possessing a first-class
navy, provisions are made for a larger contingent of trained men, to be added to the
enlisted personnel of the Navy at the outbreak of war."30 Secretary Meyer expounds upon
the shortcomings of the systems put in place in 1892: "Our provisions for this
contingency is inadequate. Beyond a few men on the retired list, for the most part too old
to render effective service, we have no other reserve than the officers and men of the
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Naval Militia of the several States."31 The Secretary then elaborated on such issues as the
lack of central control over militias and the need to emulate the legislation of the Dick
Act of 1903: "We have about 6,000 naval militia organized by the different States
bordering on the sea and on the Great Lakes. These small groups, while enthusiastic and
generally efficient, are not under central control and training. The formation of a national
naval militia, on the lines of the land militia, is a necessity and legislation is required to
accomplish this."32
The Department of the Navy continued to make recommendations for the
formation of the Naval Reserve, but without tangible results until 1911, when Meyer
finally had enough political traction to submit a bill forming a similar reserve system to
that created by the Dick Act of 1903. The department submitted to the 61st Congress a
draft bill embodying its ideas for the legal establishment of a naval reserve of officers and
men (introduced as S.7644 and H.R.24942 and entitled “A bill to provide for a reserve of
personnel for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for its enrollment”).33 This bill also
provided for a Marine Corps Reserve under the larger Naval Reserve umbrella. However,
there were various marine militias within the states that had elected to muster naval
militias in 1892.34 Like their naval counterparts, these marine militias were not regulated,
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equipped, or trained by or affiliated with the Marine Corps. The most notable of these
units were formed in New York, Massachusetts, and Louisiana. 35
The bills put forward by Secretary Meyer in 1911 established the foundations for
a Naval Reserve, yet the issues surrounding the split between the Naval Reserve and the
naval militia continued to hamper the true realization of a modern Navy and Marine
Corps Reserve. Furthermore, within the Navy, key leadership began to identify not only
the need for a robust reserve system, but also an enthusiasm for citizen enrollment. In a
report dated October 1913 to the new Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Admiral
Victor Blue, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, explained, "The importance of having a
regularly enrolled and organized Naval Reserve for service in time of war cannot be too
forcibly impressed upon the country."36 Admiral Blue explains to the Secretary of Navy
the preparations for the creation of a reserve force to help speed the process along:
"Within the last year there have been established under the Bureau of Navigation an
office of Naval Reserve." In addition, Blue calls attention to the popularity of the
potential program, and the need to act quickly to ensure the Navy benefits from the
popular interest, "To date it has a list of upwards of 2,600 men who have volunteered for
enrollment. No doubt if Congress should authorize the formation of a national reserve in
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a manner that would make the proposition attractive, there would be no difficulty in
recruiting the full quota in a very short time."37
Secretary Daniels was new to his office, and knew very little of either naval or
international affairs. He was, however, an influential newspaperman from North
Carolina. He considered himself a self-made man and held little respect for the
aristocratic behaviors exhibited by many naval officers. Daniels threw his full support to
create a federally managed reserve system, in part to allow the officer culture in the Navy
to be altered with the admittance of reserve officers into its ranks. The Secretary also
agreed with Admiral Blue's assertion that, were the United States to maintain a navy on
par with other world powers, it must form a well regulated reserve system. Less than a
year after Admiral Blue's report, Secretary Daniels began working in tandem with the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General George Barnett, to push for two
separate bills that would establish a formalized Navy and Marine Corps Reserve.38
Throughout 1914, Secretary Daniels concentrated his efforts toward expanding
the American naval forces and establishing an operational Naval Reserve. It was his
intention to both increase naval appropriations and create a reserve act for the Navy to be
passed in 1915. Major General Barnett aided Daniels in 1914 and then, in 1915, turned
his attentions toward enlarging the Marine Corps and bringing about a fully realized
Marine Corps Reserve with hopes to have a bill passed in 1916. These dual efforts were
partially motivated by the political events in Europe in 1914 and the outbreak of war in
August that year. Both endeavors proved successful.
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The first steps the Navy Department needed to take in order to realize Secretary
Daniels's ultimate goal of a Naval Reserve was to consolidate the department's control
over the naval militias. On February 16, 1914, Congress passed the Naval Militia Act,
which handed over virtually all avenues of control of the state militias to the Department
of the Navy.39 However, this act did not include the marine militias. The following April
the Navy issued Navy Department General Order No. 93, which established a Division of
Naval Militia Affairs in order to solidify a clear chain of command over the unorganized
and unregulated naval militias.40
In November, the first unofficial Marine Corps Reserve Unit was formed from an
existing marine militia contingent. The Massachusetts 1st Marine Company was created
without legislative authority, but can be considered the first foundations of the Marine
Corps Reserve. Other marine militia units established by the states between 1892 and
1914 remained in a state of limbo until 1938. Due to a lack of official records, it remains
unclear how many marine militia units were formed in this time period, but the existence
of these units did call for a clarification in order for the Department of the Navy and the
Marine Corps to retain some amount of control. On July 10, 1915, the Department of the
Navy issued General Order No. 153, which stated that the goal of a marine militia unit
was to "to organize, arm, uniform, and equip the naval militia that it may be eligible to be
rolled forth by the President of the United States to serve the United States in the event of
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war."41 The order further refined the organization of these units. This General Order was
in part an attempt to regulate the existing marine militia units prior to the creation of the
Marine Corps Reserve, which did not happen until 1916, and to help manage them until
their eventual absorption into the Marine Corps.
While General Order 153 helped define the mission and organization of the initial
marine militias, it also clarified one of the primary goals of any modernized reserve
force: the retention of veteran troops. The Order stated, “Any former enlisted man of the
Navy or Marine Corps who is in good standing in the community and who was honorably
discharged will be allowed to enter the Naval Militia without professional examination in
any unit or organization or headquarters of a brigade or of a battalion, with such rate or
rank as last held in the U.S. Navy or Marine Corps.”42 The order authorized the formation
of Marine Corps units into battalion and regiment sizes where the necessary units were
available, and set forward basic Marine Corps Branch qualifications. These final
provisions commanded by the Department of the Navy formulated the first meaningful
organization of the Marine Corps Reserve within Naval Service, and did so before there
was a legislative provision for its official creation.
Although much of the needed legal structure was in place for a centralized Marine
Corps Reserve, the service lacked official government sanctions for the component to be
fully realized. Following the plans originally set forward by Secretary of the Navy
Daniels, Major General Commandant Barnett pushed for the formation of an official
Marine Corps Reserve after the successful establishment of the Naval Reserve. In his
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Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1915, Barnett stated: "The Marine Corps has no reserve.
During the last session of Congress a naval reserve, consisting of men who have seen
service in the Navy, was created. The adoption of a similar provision for the Marine
Corps is recommended."43
Under constant pressure by the Department of the Navy, and with the ongoing
conflict in Europe, Congress passed the Marine Corps Reserve Act on 29 August 1916.
Once signed into law, the Marine Corps Reserve Act authorized the official creation of
the USMCR and raised the total strength of the Marine Corps from 344 officers and
9,921 enlisted, to 597 officers and 14,981 enlisted. The act also established the Marine
Corps Reserve Flying Corps, which fell under the command of First Lieutenant Alfred A.
Cunningham, the father of Marine Corps Aviation. Two days after Congress passed the
Marine Corps Reserve Act, the Department of the Navy issued General Order No. 231,
which stated: “A U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, to be a constituent part of the Marine Corps
and in addition to the authorized strength thereof, is hereby established under the same
provisions in all respects (except as may be necessary to adapt the said provisions to the
Marine Corps) as those providing for the Naval Reserve Force.”44
With the Marine Corps Reserve Act and General Order No. 231, the Marine
Corps Reserve officially came into existence, allowing for an expanded Naval
Department equipped with a ready force of trained men under the complete control of the
Navy. The idea of a naval reserve force, first suggested in 1898, had finally been realized.
With the war in Europe raging, the Navy Department had been able to secure additional
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funding and push for a more modernized approach to peacetime war preparations. This
new well of relatively inexpensive personnel formed a more flexible means for naval
mobilization when needed. The reserves were designed to circumvent the inherent
problems associated with militia systems and also worked to incentivize active duty
veterans to remain within the defense structure. In addition, the reserves attracted
individuals who were interested in military service, but were engaged in the civilian
world as technically trained or experienced members of the workforce, or those who were
seeking higher education. It is clear that the Department of the Navy believed that being
able to draw on those who would otherwise forego military service benefited the naval
service as a whole.
The Root Reforms of 1903 transformed the War Department into a more
proactive entity able to plan for a wide range of potential conflicts. As American foreign
policy shifted towards an outwardly focused approached, it became obvious that the
nation needed a well-trained and regulated reserve force rather than having to rely on
either militias or selective service to fill the need for military personnel. With the major
shortfalls of the militia evident after the Spanish American War, Congress passed the
Dick Act in an attempt to shift control of semi-professional personnel away from the
individual states and to the War Department. This act, along with the War Department’s
administrative restructuring under the Root Reforms, helped to bring the ground forces of
the United States into the twentieth century as a more structurally efficient and
modernized entity. While the Naval Department did not undergo the same administrative
alteration, it was able to create the reserve forces that had been originally called for in
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1889 prior to American entry into the First World War. These forces included the Marine
Corps Reserve.
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CHAPTER THREE: MARINE CORPS RESERVE: 1916-1925

The Marine Corps Reserve was reality by 1916 and the Marines continued to
improve them up to American entry into World War I. The USMCR, along with the other
reserve forces of the United States, proved to be of great benefit to the American war
effort between 1917 and 1918. The years following the end of hostilities in Europe
presented both challenges and opportunities for the Marine Corps. Concurrently, their
burgeoning reserve force underwent a self-generated reform in order to deal with the
legal shortfalls of the 1916 act that had brought it into existence.
The budget and size of the Department of the Navy increased during each fiscal
year after war broke out in Europe in 1914.45 As war raged on in Europe, and the
Department of the Navy grew, the Marine Corps attempted to capitalize on the existence
of the marine militia and their new reserve force. On 1 April 1917, just days before
Congress declared war against Germany, the Marine Corps began efforts to channel those
interested in the state-run marine militias directly into the Marine Corps Reserve. This
was followed in July of 1918 with Navy Department General Order No. 400 that
integrated all marine corps militias into the Marine Corps Reserve. This attempt to
combine all militia marines into a single reserve entity under the control of the
Department of the Navy helped to simplify the force for better control, ease the

45

Jari Eloranta, "Military Spending Patterns in History," Economic History Association, May 2, 2010,
accessed April 4, 2013, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/eloranta.military.

31
management of its administration, and ensure a consistent level of training. On the same
day that General Order No. 400 was given, July 1, 1918, Congress authorized a
temporary expansion of the Marine Corps to 3,017 commissioned officers, 342 warrant
officers, and 75,000 enlisted. This increase encompassed all three types of enlistments:
standard 4 year enlistment contracts, duration of the war contracts, and reserve
enlistments.
The mobilization of U.S. forces in 1917 demonstrated much of the perceived
benefits of having a modern reserve system. When the reserve forces of the American
military were called into service, they bolstered the amount of manpower employed
against the Central Powers. The members of the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and
the Marine Corps Reserve joined active duty personnel within the American
Expeditionary Force, while members of the Naval Reserve augmented the U.S. Navy.
Due to the evolution of reserve policies up to this point, these semiprofessional troops
were adequately trained and equipped prior to their amalgamation into their respective
services, thus enhancing America’s ability to wage modern war.46
The Marine Corps exited the First World War in a positive position. American
propaganda had elevated the reputation of this previously lesser known force into elite
shock troops capable of driving fear into enemy forces.47 The mythos surrounding the
Marine Corps during and after the war gave the force a strengthened identity and its
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deployment as a large ground force created a desire within its leadership for a more
formalized role within American defense. Once hostilities ended however, the war posed
a number of problems for not only the Marine Corps, but all the armed services.
After the 1918 armistice, the Department of the Navy and the War Department
had to contend with a loss of funding due to the public’s disillusionment with war. The
scale and destruction wrought by the Great War decreased the nation’s tolerance for
military spending. Furthermore, the military innovations spawned during the conflict
complicated traditional military views toward strategy. Advancements like the use of
military aircraft, first employed as a reconnaissance tool and then later as an offensive
weapon, led airpower advocates like Col. William "Billy" Mitchell to promote a vision of
an American military focused primarily on an independent air force.48 Others, like British
military historian and strategist J. F. C. Fuller, viewed the mechanization of war, as
embodied by the early armored vehicles, as a key to the mobility and effectiveness of
future military engagements.49 The dual problem of a lack of popular interest in military
funding and a fractured approach to future military theory led to a stagnant state of
military affairs within the United States during the Interwar Period.
Nevertheless, this complex and hampered state of military affairs did not prevent
the Marine Corps from moving forward in establishing a position within American
defense. After being fielded for the first time in large numbers under the American
Expeditionary Force, the Marine Corps leadership looked for its unique place within the
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changing world of modernized warfare. They chose to solve a perplexing problem that
faced strategists of the post-World War I era: conducting amphibious operations against a
fortified shore. During a joint British and French campaign against the Ottoman Empire
between April 25, 1915, and January 9, 1916, the Allied forces attempted a seaborne
invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula in what is now Turkey. The Allied efforts resulted in
complete failure and the repulsion of their forces became one of the greatest World War I
victories of the Ottoman Empire.
The Gallipoli Campaign had a multitude of missteps. The failure of the initial
naval operations to force a passage through the Dardanelles was due to heavy resistance
from coastal fortifications, naval mines, and poor weather conditions. To secure the
straits, the Allies attempted to conduct amphibious operations. While these attempts to
land upon the coastline of the Gallipoli peninsula were successful in capturing a small
foothold, the Allied forces failed to achieve any notable progress by the summer of 1915
and the operation ground to a halt. Unable to achieve the inland progress that was
originally planned, and hindered by the Ottomans’ ability to successfully reinforce their
frontline units, the Allies chose to abandon the campaign and evacuate their forces in
January 1916. Although this military failure did not affect the outcome of the war, it had
an important impact on postwar military thought. More importantly, it eventually proved
to be the catalyst that solidified the Marine Corps as a permanent aspect of the American
Armed Forces. 50
The difficulties of Gallipoli generated an opportunity for the Marine Corps to
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establish their own military innovation in the years that followed. The multitude of
military advancements that the First World War helped to realize or develop inspired new
modes of military thinking. The quick evolution of aircraft for military purposes
generated airpower enthusiasts; armor helped develop new schools of thought for the use
of mechanized ground forces for rapid field movements; and from the dire position the
Germans faced in the latter part of the war came the birth of modern squad tactics. These
new advancements were only a few of many that had the potential to alter the conduct of
war. Military journals from around the world shared their visions of the future of war.
Yet failures, especially like those learned during the Gallipoli Campaign, created
widespread beliefs that military endeavors like amphibious operations against fortified
positions had become tactical impossibilities.51
Despite the predominant postwar mentality that modern amphibious assaults were
too costly to be investigated, the Marine Corps saw it as an opportunity to legitimize its
contribution to American defense. As early as 1921, Marine Corps leadership identified
the Japanese Empire as America’s next most likely adversary.52 Foreseeing that a Pacific
conflict would more than likely center around the islands of Oceania, the Marines put a
tremendous effort toward solving the inherent problems presented by the failure of
Gallipoli. As the Corps focused on the development of a modern amphibious doctrine,
the state of the Marine Corps Reserve, established only two years before the armistice,
began to diminish in importance within the Department of the Navy.
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Enthusiasm after the armistice to participate in the defense establishment of the
United States lasted only a few months before a sense of postwar disillusionment set in.
Americans, and young men of military age specifically, lost interest in the military. The
Marine Corps suffered from a sharp reduction in size. The greater part of the noncommissioned officers who had contributed to wartime cohesion and esprit de corps left
when their enlistments were over. The young men who had abandoned their educational
pursuits or civilian careers to sign up for the duration of the conflict returned home to
pick up where they had left off. This was articulated by Major General John A. Lejeune,
13th Commandant of the Marine Corps, when he stated, “Nearly all of the splendid men
who had enlisted for the period of the emergency have resumed their civil occupations;
many wartime officers had separated themselves from the service; the number of enlisted
men being only about 15,000, which was altogether insufficient to perform the important
duties assigned to the Corps, there was much unrest among the officers owing to their
uncertain status; and the lavish expenditures incident to the war were to a great extent
still prevalent.”53
Both Commandant George Barnett and his successor Commandant John Lejeune
viewed the Marine Corps Reserve as a vital part of the modernizing of the Marine Corps.
Barnett, Commandant from 1914 to 1920, had overseen the official creation of the
Marine Reserve as well as an unprecedented expansion of Marine manpower doing the
First World War. As the Marine Corps demobilized, along with the rest of the American
forces after the defeat of Germany, Barnett also witnessed the dramatic contraction of the
service. In his final month as Commandant, Major General Barnett petitioned to activate
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1,000 reserves, but the Secretary of the Navy denied the request. When Lejeune took over
for Barnett in July 1920, he openly stated that he considered that one of his major goals
as Commandant was to "recreate the Reserve as a constituent part of the wartime strength
of the Marine Corps."54 However, in his first annual report to the Secretary of the Navy
on October 14, 1920, Lejeune only mentioned the reserve relative to the selection board
when considering wartime reserve officers for regular commissions.
While concern for the reserves was not shown in Lejeune's first report to the
Secretary of the Navy, he did address his concern about the future status of the Marine
Corps Reserve on March 6, 1920 in a staff memorandum to then Commandant Barnett.
This memorandum from Lejeune indicates that the commander of the elements of the
Marine Corps in the American Expeditionary Force understood the inherent value of a
well regulated and modern reserve force during a prolonged conflict. Lejeune’s reasons
included that reserves: supplied recruitment of personnel in addition to the authorized
strength of the regular establishment; presented the opportunity to recruit officers after
the allotment for active duty officer quotas had been filled; and provided the ability to
continue down a path of gaining quality recruits (primarily officers) instead of a mass
quantity with no filtering process. With a varying size of 2,000 to 5,000 men within the
reserves, Headquarters Marine Corps sought to ensure that it recruited potential officers
who wanted to have a direct affiliation with the Marine Corps and who desired to
participate in annual training duty at posts within the continental limits and were willing
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to participate in field training on a regular basis.55
The Marine Corps leadership did in fact identify their reserves as an important
aspect of their force. Yet, the 1920s posed the critical question of whether the reserves
could prove to be a useful aspect of the Marines during peacetime to a degree that would
warrant the allocation of public funds. If the reserves failed to prove themselves in this
regard, it was possible that they would dissolve during this period of disinterest in
defense. This problem was only one of a number of issues facing the Corps. Congress
slashed the Marine Corps’ authorized personnel from 27,000 to 20,000 during the fiscal
year of 1921 as recruitment for the service hit an all-time low. The reserves also dwindled
in 1921. By September 21, 1921, the Marine Corps Reserve only had 555 officers and
4,068 enlisted and was facing a major crisis the following year, as this memorandum
from Marine Corps Headquarters demonstrates, “One-half of the enlisted personnel of the
Marine Corps Reserve will be discharged upon expiration of enrollments by April 1,
1922, unless new enrollment or re-enrollments offset the losses, which is not expected
unless a drive for new recruits is made. There have been 88 enrollments during the
present calendar year.”56 In addition to diminishing manpower, the Marine Corps Reserve
faced a number of problems that were hurting efforts to solidify the organization’s
permanence. Communication between the reserve units and Headquarters was not well
organized, and Headquarters focused much of its recruiting efforts on maintaining its
active duty forces. Furthermore, Marine Reserve officers were often convinced to switch
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over to the National Guard and the Army Reserves of their home states.57
Between 1921 and 1925, the Marine Corps Reserve continued to slide closer to
uselessness. As the Marine Corps fought for appropriations while engaged in conflicts in
China and Nicaragua, Congress placed the importance for allocating funds for the
reserves further down the line of priorities. In June 1923, only 136 officers and 433
enlisted comprised the reserves. Of those, only six officers and twenty-one enlisted
reported for annual active duty training. The next year saw only a marginal increase of
one new officer and fifty-nine enlistees, bringing the total strength of the Marine Corps
Reserve to 137 officers and 502 enlisted. However, the tide began to turn for the Marine
Corps Reserve the following year.58
A core group of Marine Corps Reserve officers who recognized the downward
trend in the reserves began working outside the official channels to prop up the
organization. Contacting members of Congress and the Secretary of the Navy in person,
or over the telephone, these officers were able to influence the creation of official
legislation that produced a much needed jolt to the heartbeat of the Marine Corps
Reserve. Passed on February 28, 1925, “The Act of Congress to provide for the creation,
organization, administration, and maintenance of the Naval Reserve and a Marine Corps
Reserve" helped better ensure the future of the Marine Corps Reserve by replacing the
Marine Corps Reserve Act of 1916.59
The Reserve Act of 1925, sponsored by Senator William Rockford, became
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effective 1 July 1925 and contained the following provision regarding the Marine Corps
Reserve: “Section 2. That the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, established under the Act of
August 29, 1916, is hereby abolished and in lieu thereof there is created and established,
as a component part of the U.S. Marine Corps a Marine Corps Reserve, under the same
provisions in all respects (except as may be necessary to adapt the said provisions to the
Marine Corps) as those contained in this Act or which may hereafter be enacted
providing for the Naval Reserve.”60 This legislation helped to correct specific aspects
lacking in the 1916 Act, among which were the authority to commission officers up to the
rank of brigadier general, the appointment of twenty-five men to the Naval Academy, and
the extension of the benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act to members of
the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve injured in the line of duty.61
These provisions for the Marine Reserve made participation more enticing for
potential recruits, opened up much needed positions within the ranks of commissioned
officers, stabilized pay, created less out of pocket expenditures, and provided financial
protection from the inherent dangers associated with military service.62 These additions to
the legal treatment of the reserves and their participants succeeded in making service
within the reserves more tolerable and aided in the recruitment of new personnel. The
Reserve Act of 1925 served as a tremendous upgrade to the newly-founded Marine
Reserves, but its provisions were tested during the lean years that followed and by no
means did the Reserve Act guarantee a permanent future for the Marine Corps Reserve.
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From the formal foundation of the Marine Corps Reserve, provided for in the
Marine Corps Reserve Act of 1916, to the Reserve Act of 1925, the USMCR established
that it was both a wartime asset and also capable of surviving and evolving during
peacetime. While the Regular Marine Corps continued to tout its support for a Marine
Corps Reserve, most of its attentions were focused on finding the service's niche in the
modern era: amphibious operations. As the Reserve Act of 1925 indicates, it was up to
the members of the Marine Corps Reserve themselves to secure the organization's future.
A year after the bill was passed, a young World War I veteran and devout Marine Corps
loyalist joined the USMCR. Melvin J. Maas, a 27 year old Minnesotan and former
noncommissioned officer during the First World War, was the ideal candidate for the
Marine Corps Reserve. His participation within the reserves was crucial to the evolution
of the Marine Corps Reserve in the remainder of the Interwar Period and the Marine
Corps’ posture at the outbreak of the Pacific War.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MELVIN J. MAAS: MARINE AND LEGISLATOR

The Reserve Act of 1925, driven in part by officers of the USMCR, established a
new starting point for the organization. Shortly after the act was passed, Melvin Maas
joined the ranks of the Marine Corps Reserve. The ambitious World War I veteran
continued the progress made by his fellow officers in 1925 but in a more aggressive
fashion. Using a loophole spawned by the creation of the reserve system, Maas formed a
special interest group representing the Marine Reserve and concurrently became a
member of the House of Representatives. These actions allowed Maas to directly
improve the conditions of the USMCR through the legislative process. Although his
passionate views on American defense often put him at odds with many of his peers, and
placed both his careers as an officer and a state representative in jeopardy, Maas
continued to fight for the expansion of the American defense establishment.
Melvin J. Maas was born May 14, 1898, in Duluth, Minnesota. Two years later,
the Maas family relocated to the Minneapolis area where Maas’s father founded a bakery
supply firm. Maas had a relatively uneventful childhood and upon graduation from
Central High School in 1916 enrolled in St. Thomas College. As war loomed on the
horizon, Maas dropped out of St. Thomas, turned down an appointment to West Point,
and on April 23, 1917, enlisted in the Marine Corps.63
Maas's desire to participate in the First World War and his eagerness to join the
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fight as quickly as possible were not unique. The motivation of young Americans to
prove themselves in combat in the second decade of the twentieth century helped to swell
the ranks of the armed forces. The enthusiasm for the war was not just present in the
American youth of 1917, but also in the public at large. This support translated into large
military budgets for both the Department of the Navy and the Department of War and
increased size allocations for each military service.
Maas wanted to join the action on the Western Front as quickly as possible and
believed that enlistment into the Marines increased his chances of participating in the
conflict. Upon signing an enlistment for the duration of the war, Maas was shipped to
Mare Island, California, for basic training, where he expressed interest in the newly
organized Marine Aero Company No. One being formed at Cape May, New Jersey. On
July 14, 1917, Maas was assigned to the 79th Company at Quantico, Virginia, before
being reassigned to Marine Aero Company No. One. During this period of training and
unit transfers, he was promoted to the rank of corporal and in the first week of January
his unit boarded the USS Hancock bound for the Azores Islands, west of Portugal. 64
Once Marine Aero Company No. One arrived in the Azores, they were assigned
to Base Number 13 at Ponta Delgada on St. Miguel Island. Soon thereafter, they were
given their primary assignment: scouting by air for German submarines and other enemy
craft off the coast of Portugal. This assignment employed the use of the Curtis Jenny
Biplane (JN-4A), which was armed with a pair of belt-fed machine guns mounted in front
of the pilot. Maas conducted a number of aerial observation missions during the course of
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the war. He also spent time on sea duty as the acting sergeant with responsibilities for his
men.65 While at sea, Cpl. Maas wrote a guide entitled "For Officers to Remember," which
demonstrated his caliber as a leader of marines. This guide covered several aspects of
Marine Corps leadership, including advice on how to interact with subordinates in an
official yet respectful manner. Some of the more notable observations are: “Talk to the
enlisted men in an official way only about necessary things not things that are of no
concern to officers; do not nag men and tell them to do things that they are about to do
anyway or are doing; IN OTHER WORDS, DON'T INSULT THEIR INTELLIGENCE. .
. . Don't begrudge A WORD OF APPRECIATION. IT IS ENCOURAGEMENT. . . .
Give the men as much liberty and leeway as possible and beyond that BE STRICT.”66
That as a noncommissioned office Maas would make these bold suggestions denotes the
dedication, pride, and motivation he possessed in his time as a young enlisted. It is no
small feat to put forth such suggestions to one's superior officers; that he did so
demonstrates the seriousness that Maas had toward approaching his duty as a Corporal of
Marines. Maas's outstanding performance during the course of the war earned him a
number of commendations and, when he rotated back to the United States after the
armistice, he was selected to receive an officer commission.
Maas did not, however, go on to Officer Candidate School directly after the war.
The Spanish Influenza pandemic raced across the globe and it struck him in late 1918.
During his recovery in a military hospital, Maas decided that he had accomplished his
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original goal of participating in the First World War. By mid-1919, with his duration of
the war contract fulfilled, he declined his opportunity to become an officer and returned
home to Minnesota.67
Upon his release from active duty, Maas put the Marine Corps behind him and
moved forward with civilian life. He married in 1920, finished his education, and by
1924 was the head of a successful insurance agency, Dwyers-Maas Co., based out of St.
Paul. However, the following year saw a resurgence in Maas's connection to the Marine
Corps. Missing the camaraderie and esprit de corps that military service gave him, Maas
helped to organize former marines from his area into a social club: The Marine Clubs of
Minnesota. It was through Maas's reconnection with these former marines that he first
learned of the existence of the Marine Corps Reserve.68
Maas was the ideal candidate for the Marine Corps Reserve and was an example
of why the armed forces created modern reserve forces in the years leading up to the First
World War. Maas was a veteran of active duty service, a productive member of the
civilian work force, and possessed a college education. Furthermore, Maas exemplified
the qualities that the rigorous officer selection process was searching for—all the
aforementioned aspects for a reservist, but also one who demonstrated a high level of
motivation, responsibility, and charisma.
Maas's longing to rejoin the ranks of the Marine Corps had grown quite strong in
the six years since he left active duty. Realizing that the reserves were a perfect balance
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between fulfilling his civilian responsibilities and continuing his involvement in the
armed forces, he departed for Officer Candidate School. As a former enlisted, Maas
excelled during his training, and in late 1925 earned his commission as a Second
Lieutenant. Maas returned to Minnesota to pursue a new career path in politics. In this
new calling, Maas eventually helped shape the Marine Corps Reserve and ensure a future
for the entire Marine Corps, but initially, however, he had other political motivations.
Maas's dislike for the 18th Amendment and its transgression of American
freedom motivated him to run for political office in his home state of Minnesota in
1926.69 As a young man, Maas was outraged at the passing of the Volstead Act, which
became law in October 1919. While Maas was not partial to heavy drinking, he did
oppose the government's attempt to prohibit the rights of American citizens to consume
alcohol. Maas’s sentiments were in part due to the link between alcohol consumption and
the founding of the Marine Corps. On November 10, 1775, the first Commandant of the
Marine Corps, Major Samuel Nicholas, established the first recruiting station at Tun
Tavern in Philadelphia, and thus the consumption of alcohol has been an unofficial, yet in
many ways essential, aspect of Marine Corps service.
Maas's core issues were not very popular. Although a good portion of
Minnesotans opposed the 18th Amendment, prohibition had been written into the
Constitution and many saw it as either a positive step or a non-issue. His stance on a
strong national defense also failed to connect with his constituents. This was in part due
to the rhetoric of the time touting that after the previous conflict there ostensibly would
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never be another major war. While his platform may have been weak in the eyes of
voters, Maas's campaigning efforts succeeded and he joined the House of Representatives
at the age of 27, at that time one of the youngest citizens ever elected to Congress.70
Between his commission and his election to office, Maas identified a critical way
he could help the Marine Corps Reserve. The Reserve Act of 1925 served as a stabilizing
piece of legislation for the organization, but several key issues continued to endanger
both its future and the quality of marines it produced. Maas, along with a group of
officers whom he had met at Officer Candidate School, wanted to rectify the lack of an
official training program for reserve units. Identifying this as a precarious shortcoming
and, despite having virtually no influence as a newly commissioned second lieutenant,
Maas, and with his fellow officers established a professional guild of Marine Reserve
officers. The Marine Corps Reserve Officers' Association (MCROA) was founded on the
151st Marine Corps Birthday with Maas serving as president. The organization stated that
its prime objective was to "induce the Marine Corps to prepare a program of Reserve
training, and obtain from Congress, by their own direct contact, small appropriations for
such training."71
Under Maas’s presidency, the MCROA also identified other issues plaguing the
Marine Corps Reserve in the 1920s. The major problems facing the Marine Reserve in
1926 centered primarily around funding. Fledgling reserve units had no official training
areas and consequently relied on either site rentals or the use of rent-free areas
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(condemned buildings, armories, old barracks, etc.). Furthermore, these units had little
access to equipment, forcing them to use either old military surplus or makeshift standins. To make matters worse, funding was so limited that only a portion of reserve outfits
were issued regulation clothing and those unlucky enough to not have them provided
were forced to procure them with private funds in order to meet uniform regulations. In
addition, the reserves lacked provisions for promotions, retirement, and medical benefits.
The members of the MCROA spent the next 15 years tirelessly trying to solve these
issues through articles in professional journals, political action, and public relations.72
When Maas joined the 70th Congress, he was uniquely positioned to promote the
interests of the Marine Corps in a way that circumvented a specific aspect of the civilmilitary relationship: military officers' non-participation in elected office. The American
military had never been fully divorced from politics, but active participation in
governmental politics was considered against the ideals of American government.73
Traditionally, professional officers maintained a politically neutral stance in public while
they were active members of their given services, and the notion of holding an elective
office, or being a member of a special interest group, far exceeded that belief. Members
of militias were not bound by this, but that was because militias were state controlled.
The reserves created a loophole in which officers who were involved with the reserves
could hold political office, even if they were technically under the command of either the
Department of the Navy or the Department of War. Thus, Maas was able to
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simultaneously be a marine officer, the President of the MCROA, and a member of
Congress.
During the first years of Maas's joint political and reserve careers, the Marine
Corps Reserve maintained a relatively stable size of approximately 6,100 (Fleet Marine
Reserve: 219 officer, 3,215 enlisted; Volunteer Marine Reserve: 196 officers 2,370
enlisted). Advocates for the Marine Reserve, including Maas, attempted to increase the
level of training for reservists by providing correspondence courses from Marine Corps
schools. Both officers and enlisted personnel began participating in large numbers, and
their interest opened up opportunities for Fleet Marine Reservists to attend courses at the
Marine Corps Institute. Although training became more available for the reserves,
centralized leadership of the organization remained a stumbling block. General Lejeune,
recognizing a clear opportunity to improve his reserve forces, appointed Brigadier
General Ben H. Fuller, Assistant to the Major General Commandant, as Officer in
Charge, Marine Corps Reserve. With representation now at the highest levels of the
command structure, the Marine Corps Reserve had a clear line of communication that
facilitated its development during the following decade.
As training opportunities increased for marine reservists and the conditions of
their units improved, interest in the MCROA mounted and membership rose, thus
elevating the organization’s importance. Members of the MCROA, including Maas,
began writing articles for professional service journals regarding the critical role of the
reserves within modern militaries. Furthermore, the MCROA began publishing its own
journal, Word, to help solidify key ideas about the future of the reserve system within the
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armed forces.74
Despite steady improvements made by both proponents of the Marine Reserve
and the MCROA, the units that made up the force faced a number of hardships early on,
as Lt. General Richard C. Mangrum later recounted, “The Reserve officer on active duty
understandably was something of an enigma and outlander, vaguely mistrusted, and
undoubtably not here to stay! In a way, this was not a bad crucible for shaping good
Reserve officers. . . .They had to prove their worth. And did. It was uphill, however, for
the first several years.”75 In 1928, in order to improve upon the reserve component of the
Marine Corps, General Fuller utilized the Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board. At first,
the board consisted of active duty officers, but as time went on reserve officers served on
the board as voting members, rotating membership every two years. However, before
reserve officers were allowed to sit on the board, 1st Lt. Maas, due his presidency of the
growing MCROA, was allowed to sit in on policy meetings. The Marine Corps Reserve
Policy Board and the MCROA formed a close relationship. This relationship allowed a
“trickle up” of recommendations from reserve officers to the attention of local MCROA
chapters, then to the national headquarters, and eventually to the policy board, where they
could be discussed and either passed on or turned into policy recommendations.76
In February 1929, Maas, now a Captain then attached to an infantry company,
requested reassignment to the aviation section of the USMCR, stating the following
qualifications: "I hold a pilot's license from the Department of Commerce; served in the
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Marine Corps Aviation Branch in 1917 and 1918; and have considerable instruction in
military aviation at the U.S. Army schools at Brooks and Jelly Fields, San Antonio,
Texas."77 The command granted Maas's request, and he graduated from aviation school
later that year. His opportunity to attend this school was made possible, in part, by funds
that Congress had specifically set aside for reservists to train on a limited number of
aircraft. Prior to Congress's allocation of funds, there was a considerable amount of
tension between regular and reserve pilots regarding access to aviation schools and
training aircraft. After attending flight training, Maas helped establish the first Marine
Reserve Aviation Squadron, a feat only accomplished on the stipulation that pilots
conduct training within the unit and without pay. Maas's experience and interest in
aviation continued to shape his political stance on American defense and his transfer to a
Marine Aviation Wing within the reserves altered the course of his military career.
Maas continually fought for increased funding for the Navy Department.
However, he was also a proponent of the development of airpower in all of the American
Armed Forces, partially due to his experiences with Marine Corps aviation during and
after the First World War. Maas was strongly influenced by the airpower philosophies of
the 1920s, like those of Billy Mitchell, and was convinced of the value of the
development of a strong air force. After voters from the Fourth District in Minnesota
reelected Maas in 1929, he gave a radio address on September 13 that outlined his views
on airpower. Maas began his radio address by outlining a brief history of the
development of the airplane and its use during the First World War. In the address, he
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applauded the fact that human flight was first realized in the United States and pointed
out the various benefits, besides warfare, that aviation provided. Maas explained the
differing approaches of the United States and European nations took toward commercial
aviation. He contended that American unwillingness to subsidize commercial aviation
pushed privately-owned companies toward a greater degree of innovation when
compared to European nations that allocated subsidies. He pointed out that as the US
became more adept at using new forms of aeronautics within its infrastructure, it rapidly
increased the nation's potential position for future airpower and defense. Maas concluded
his speech with a push for the creation of a military academy specifically for aviation that
would be on par with West Point and Annapolis. He also recommended an increase in
funding for all forms of military aviation.78 Although his constituents were in favor of his
suggestions to improve American airpower, Congress ignored his assertions.
In the months that followed, Maas continued to express his concerns for the lack
of financial attention that airpower received as well as for the atrophying defensive
capabilities of the armed forces. He argued fervently for an increase in budget, but
encountered only indifference from Congress. Overcome with anxiety, Maas made a
drastic and in many ways reckless example of the potential destructive power of an attack
from the air.
In the days leading up to President Hoover's 1929 address to the joint session of
Congress, Maas pointed out to his colleagues that the Chief Executive, the Cabinet, the
two Houses of Congress, and the members of the Supreme Court would all be assembled
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in the Capitol at one time. He warned them, "If anyone dropped just one bomb from a
plane, it would be the end of our national government. This country needs better
protection [from the threat of an air offensive]."79 Maas's arguments were met with heavy
skepticism by his fellow legislators, as they believed the natural boundaries provided by
vast oceans rendered Washington immune from such a threat. Maas concluded that the
only way to make his fellow congressmen understand the genuine threat airpower posed
was to conduct a very dangerous demonstration.
Instead of attending the joint session, Maas rushed to Bolling Field (located
outside of Washington, D.C.) and commandeered a small World War I pursuit plane.
Once airborne Maas began circling the D.C. area. At exactly 12:00 pm, when the
statesmen and dignitaries of the nation had settled down to listen to the President's
message, Maas made a faux dive-bombing run centered on the House skylight. He
narrowly missed crashing into the building and the joint session attendees were thrown
into a short-lived panic as the chamber room was rocked by the flyby. As soon as the
commotion subsided, Maas’s office received a phone call from the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General Wendell C. Neville, asking to speak with Maas immediately upon
his return.80
Commandant Neville served Maas with a severe dressing down, followed by the
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decision that he would need to report for urgent duty outside of the District of Columbia
in order to help avoid further media attention. Maas’s office denied any pertinent
information to reporters, hoping to avoid a negative reaction from his constituents. When
Maas did resurface, he was not reluctant to discuss the joint session demonstration,
telling reporters, "People said that no plane could get within ten miles of the Capitol. I
wanted to show that one bomb could wipe out the entire Government."81 His rogue
actions may have endangered his military career, but Maas believed that by doing so he
was able to change the minds of a number of his colleagues in regard to the very serious
matter of national defense.82
The reprimand by Neville, and Maas’s immediate transfer, were more than likely
punctuated by other stern conversations regarding his aerial demonstration. However, no
formal punitive measures were ever carried out. This may be in part due to Maas’s
position within civilian government, and his increasing value to the Marine Corps. In
addition, the direct phone call from the Commandant illustrates that, while Maas may
have only been a captain within the Marine Corps Reserve, his connections to the highest
tier of Marine Corps leadership was abundantly clear.
As Maas and the MCROA became more influential within the Marine Corps, his
political weight increased within Congress. In 1927, Maas was appointed to the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. While on the committee, Maas argued for American
isolationism, but also pushed for a more expansive defense to guard against possible
foreign aggression. In 1930, Maas was appointed to the House Committee on Military
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Affairs where he continued to fight for greater allocation for defense appropriations.
Later that year, Maas gave a speech outlining his convictions entitled "Peace not
Pacifism." During this oration, he explained his contention that pacifism was a growing
trend that put America in danger because it labeled those who believed in defensive
spending as “radicals.” Maas believed that in order to retain America's place in the
twentieth century, it must bolster its armed forces, and doing so was the only road to
keeping it out of possible conflict.83
Melvin Maas had been a product of the early twentieth century Marine Corps.
Driven at a young age to enlist during the build up to the First World War, Maas
underwent an intense indoctrination that forever tied him to the Corps. His experiences
within Marine Aviation during the conflict exposed him to the potential of airpower,
endearing him to new ideas about warfare and national defense. As a young veteran
returned to civilian life, he was the ideal candidate for the early reserve system, and upon
seeing the opportunity to continue his involvement with the Marine Corps, he gladly
accepted his commission as an officer. Yet, Maas became more than the ideal candidate
for the newly formed Marine Corps Reserve. His politically oriented aspirations allowed
for the fledgling Marine Corps Reserve to have a voice within Congress—a voice that
was increasingly influential throughout the 1930s. Maas's approach to changing the
opinions of his fellow congressmen may have teetered on the verge of recklessness, as his
faux bombing attack illustrates, but his efforts to argue for his vision of American
defense continued. As the Great Depression set in, new challenges arose that Maas met
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with further dedication to both the Marine Corps and American defense.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MAAS’S RELEVANCE GROWS

The American public's approach to defense altered significantly in the wake of the
First World War. Defense advocates, like Maas, fought diligently to maintain the armed
forces but were beset by a public apathetic to military affairs. The difficulties faced by
pro-defense members of Congress only increased as the nation fell under the grips of
financial crisis. The Great Depression deeply affected American military budgets, and
only exacerbated the issues facing Maas and others fighting to keep America prepared for
potential international conflict. Throughout the decade, Maas found new and innovative
ways to strengthen the Marine Corps Reserve and, in one specific case, stop an attempt to
abolish the Corps entirely. His defensive foresight, understanding of the importance of
the reserve forces, and dogged loyalty to the Marine Corps helped change the course of
the Second World War, and lay some of the most vital cornerstones of what would
become the Department of Defense.
The stock market crash of 1929 greatly influenced the political landscape in
which Maas participated. Much of the early headway made by pro-defense factions
within Congress was eroded as attentions turned to more inwardly oriented economic
issues. Although defense budgets continued to allow for the maintenance and
advancement of the armed services, a cost saving proposal was put forward in 1933 that
set out to abolish the Marine Corps and redistribute the savings toward the larger
services.
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Advocating the demise of the Marine Corps was not a new political tactic for cost
savings. At numerous times during the nation’s history, the Corps had become the target
of civilian and military leaders who attempted to reduce defense spending, streamline the
armed services, and avoid what those outside of naval service saw as a duplication of the
Army. 84 Although the Marine Corps survived these previous attempts to disband the
service, the financial crisis of the Great Depression made the 1933 proposal a true threat
to the Corps' future.
Up until 1933,Maas's main political objectives centered around a strong national
defense that included the development and expansion of American airpower and the
modernization of the reserve system established earlier in the century. Maas contended
that each branch of the armed forces should be adequately funded. However, his personal
connection to the Marine Corps dramatically influenced his vision of what constituted a
robust national defense program. When Maas learned of the efforts of Secretary of War
Patrick J. Hurley to significantly reduce the authorized strength of the Marine Corps, he
sprung into action.
Secretary Hurley proposed a cost saving measure directly to President Hoover
that would have functionally reduced the Marine Corps to merely a naval police force.
Hurley argued that eliminating wasteful spending on what he viewed as a duplication of
the Army was an ideal way to strengthen the War Department and at the same time
reduce the national budget during the economic crisis. Hoover was favorable to Hurley's
suggestions until Maas intervened on behalf of the Marine Corps.
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By 1933, Maas was in a unique and powerful position. He remained president of
the MCROA, an organization that had steadily grown since its inception. In addition, he
was a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs. Once news spread of
Secretary Hurley’s efforts, these positions, combined with his direct linkage to the
highest level of Marine Corps leadership, made Maas an ideal defender of the service.
Utilizing funds from the MCROA, Maas took to the national airwaves on February 11 at
Goldstine Studios, located in Washington D.C., with access to broadcast to eighty-seven
other stations throughout the United States.85
Today there are fewer American Marines than there are policeman in Greater
New York City and yet the President's budget estimates submitted to Congress
calls for the reduction of 1,748 of them. If the reduction is made the Marines will
have lost a quarter of their strength within less than three years, their morale and
esprit de corps will be seriously injured and there will not be a sufficient number
of Marines to perform the duties required of them. So if Congress does not use
common sense and reject this executive recommendation the Marines practically
will be rendered useless as an instrument of national defense.86
While Maas began his plea to the American people as a concerned Congressman
worried about the fate of one of the military services, it is in the following statements that
he revealed a deep understanding of the Marine Corps and Marine culture:
This morale and esprit de corps that I have just mentioned is more than a mere
phrase. It represents a vital part of the the growing soul of America. It is part of
that element of our country that stirs the emotional and patriotic centers of all
Americans. It is something that cannot be built up except through loyalty,
courage, and a long period of time. It cannot be bought because it is priceless. It
has taken the American Marines 157 years to build it up, and yet right now in the
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year 1933 it is proposed to place it aside as if it were an old glove. No one would
think of melting up the Liberty Bell to get a few paltry dollars, would they?87
In this address, Maas demonstrated that not only was he loyal to the Marine
Corps, but that he believed the Marine Corps was, in ways, the soul of the American
people. Even his analogy to the Liberty Bell demonstrated that Maas likened the service
to an historical treasure that was vital to the very identity of the United States, thus
illustrating the foolishness of weakening the Corps’ role in national defense. Later in the
address Maas compared the total cost of the Marines to the soda and tobacco
consumption of the American people.88 He went on to call into question Congressional
financial decisions to fund numerous projects that had cost millions of taxpayer dollars
but had little hope of benefiting the American people.
Maas reminded listeners of the Navy's assessment of the irreplaceable role the
Marines performed within naval service. He argued that the Army could not be tasked
with the specific roles that the Marines play within a successful naval operation. He also
explained both the origin of the service and its various successful fights against previous
attempts to disband it. He emphasized the Marines’ contributions in America's previous
conflicts and then concluded: "Strange as it may be for my listeners to hear it, the
Marines should receive the support of all pacifists, particularly the most fanatical, for
they either prevent wars or shorten them."89
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In his conclusion, Maas justified the fiscal viability of the Marine Corps, stating,
“In the interest of economy the Marine Corps should remain unimpaired. The Marines
provide the most efficient and most economical form of our National Defense. It is the
cheapest force, dollar for dollar man for man.”90 Maas employed his adept political skill
emphasizing the necessity for cost effective defense to a public beleaguered by the
financial crisis of the 1930s. In his closing statements,, he subtly alludes to the specter of
the Marine Corps’ next adversary and the service’s effectiveness at carrying out
American foreign policy:
Surely we will not cover our egos with a penny and lose our most valuable,
useful, active, and most economical asset of National Defense as are the Marines.
A group of Americans that are fired with as intense a spirit of devotion to flag as
ever sent a samurai of Japan to death for his government.91 A fighting man who
serves as infantry, blue jacket, artillerist, cavalryman, policeman in guarding U.S.
calls, servant of the State Department in carrying out the President's foreign
policies, and all as a United States Marine. The History of the Marines is the
History of our country.92
Maas’s blending of an economical approach to defense, praise of the Marine Corps’
versatility and usefulness, and faint warning of a potential war against the Empire of
Japan exhibits his firm grasp of domestic politics, and both international and military
affairs.
Through his efforts, Maas halted any further attempts by Secretary Hurley to
defund the service. After the radio address, thousands of letters and over 10,000
telegrams flooded President Hoover's office supporting Maas’s views and in favor of the
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continual funding of the Marine Corps. Hoover ceased his original pursuit, but he
stipulated that the Marine Corps could not breach a total strength of 10,000 men, a limit
that both Maas and the Commandant were content with in 1933. With yet another attempt
to weaken the Marine Corps blocked, Maas turned his attention toward his primary goal
of strengthening the Marine Corps Reserve.93
During the early 1930s, while Maas performed his governmental duties as a
Congressman, he continued to train with his reserve unit, achieving the rank of major in
1935. Under his presidency, the MCROA continued to grow in both members and
influence within the political landscape. The Marine Corps Reserve also retained its size
and remained a viable asset to the larger Marine Corps despite the lack of funding it had
struggled with since its inception.
No major changes to the force took place until an unfortunate turn of events
motivated Maas to improve specific beneficiary coverage to those who chose to join the
Marine Reserves. In early 1936, Maas took part in the yearly pistol qualification course
set forward by the Marine Corps training curriculum. At that time, the Colt 1911 .45
caliber pistol was the standard sidearm for all branches of the American military. On the
training course, Maas's .45 pistol suffered a hang-fire and, while trying to clear the
malfunction, the pistol discharged in his face. The bullet penetrated Maas’s lower jaw,
knocking out the lower row of his front teeth and ripping his upper lip. Although Maas
narrowly avoid a fatal wound, he was seriously injured. He was rushed to Bethesda Naval
Hospital where his wounds were treated. Maas underwent major emergency dental
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treatment and required seventeen stitches. While recovering from his wounds, Maas was
informed that he was not eligible for medical coverage due to his reserve status. The total
bill for treatment was in excess of $600.00.94
Thanks to his successful partnership with the insurance firm that he founded
before he entered politics, Maas was able to pay his medical bills in full. However, he
realized that had the accident befallen another marine, that marine may have found
himself in a grave financial situation, all while volunteering in the defense of the nation.
Maas had already worked to improve the funding allocated for the reserves and, through
the parallel efforts of the Congressman and the MCROA, the force garnered increasing
amounts of attention from Headquarters Marine Corps. Yet, Maas's accident motivated
him to ensure that reservists qualified for medical and death benefits while conducting
training exercises. Prior to 1936, these marines were only covered if they were called into
active service and, as Maas's accident proved, troops were susceptible to injury and death
during military training, not just when engaged in combat operations.
As soon as Maas recovered enough from his wounds, he drafted a bill that
guaranteed medical and death coverage to Marine and Navy Reservists during their
training. Still wrapped in gauze, Maas testified in front of his fellow Congressmen
regarding his near fatal experience while conducting standard training. His bill passed
both the House and the Senate, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed it into law.
This bill constituted a specific goal for Maas and the Marine Corps Reserve. Appropriate
funding was paramount to the force's survival, but a close second was the proper
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treatment of those who chose to join. The extension of benefits was just one of a number
of efforts that were made to improve the treatment of Marine Reservists and these efforts
both helped entice new recruits as well as retain those already in uniform. Although the
extension of benefits was an improvement, Maas soon went to work to overhaul the
entire reserve system.
With tensions mounting in Europe, Maas began designing a legislative act that
bridged the Naval Reserve forces from their 1930's structure into a modernized force
capable of rapid mobilization. In early 1937, Maas and other pro-reserve legislators
began drafting the Naval Reserve Act of 1938. Their efforts resulted in an act that
provided for further training allocations for all Naval Reserve, including the Marine
Corps Reserve, and laid out the development of training schedules and programs for
individual reserve battalions. These individualized schedules allowed for battalion
commanders to generate specialized funding requests, training standards, and yearly
calendars for qualifications based on a unit’s purpose. As a result, the quality and
effectiveness of reserve battalions increased dramatically.95
The Naval Reserve Act of 1938 did more than improve upon the training of the
Marine Corps Reserve; it reorganized the USMCR into three groups: the Fleet Marine
Reserve, the Organized Marine Reserve, and the Volunteer Marine Reserve. Each of
these divisions within the new reserve system allowed the Marines to cast a wider net for
potential recruitment. The reorganization clarified unresolved issues not addressed in
1925 and streamlined the reserves into a more manageable entity. The act also increased
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pay and created an honorary retired list. The reorganization of the various arms of the
Marine Corps Reserve up to this point brought the entire force under the control of the
Marine Corps for the first time since its creation, rather than elements being technically
under the control of the Navy.96
The Naval Reserve Act of 1938, strongly supported by the MCROA, became the
bedrock for future reserve legislation for all military branches after the Second World
War. With the Naval Reserve Act of 1938 in place, Maas completed his initial goal of
creating a modernized Marine Corps Reserve. The reserve forces of the United States
Marine Corps survived years of underfunding by relying on the loyalty of its members in
order to remain a viable aspect of the overall service. Through Maas’s efforts and those
of his political allies, the Marine Corps Reserve modernized and offered new
opportunities to its servicemen, increasing the attractiveness of the organization to
American citizens interested in participating. By providing pay and training
opportunities, and extending medical, death, and retirement benefits, Maas shaped the
Marine Corps Reserve into a force in readiness during the Interwar Period. His constant
efforts to cultivate the reserves and his defense of the Marine Corps in 1933 made him an
asset to the pre-World War II Marine Corps. However, it was not until the outbreak of the
conflict that Maas's impact on the effectiveness on the Marine Corps was realized; more
importantly, his tireless crafting of the Marine Corps Reserve helped change the course of
the Pacific War.
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CHAPTER SIX: MAAS, JAPAN, AND THE MOBILIZATION
OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The efforts of Congressman Melvin Maas during the 1930's to forge a modern
reserve system within the Department of the Navy, with an emphasis upon the Marine
Corps Reserve, were realized with the passing of the Naval Reserve Act of 1938.
Through his own experiences as both an enlisted marine and as an officer in the reserves,
Maas was able to guide legislation that prepared the Marine Corps for rapid
mobilization—a mobilization that was only a few short years away. Yet, during the years
leading up to American entry into the war, Maas continued to promote American
isolationism in the face of growing tensions in Europe, believing instead that the true
threat to America lay to the East.
The closing years of the 1930's yielded a series of international conflicts that
tested the United States’ resolve to remain neutral. Japan's aggression toward China and
Nazi Germany's pugnacious foreign policies produced a contentious atmosphere on the
world stage. Cautious from the experiences of the Great War, a portion of the American
public opposed engaging in diplomatic actions that might drag the nation into affairs that
were widely regarded as either European or Asian problems. Veterans groups,
specifically the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), lobbied continuously to retain
America’s stance on neutrality and contended that the only way to do so was through
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adequate military spending.97 Maas had allied himself with the VFW throughout his
political career, calling upon their Minnesota members for support during campaign
years. The VFW's view on a strong national defense as a means for continued peace
and their overarching stance on neutrality aligned with Maas's continual political
messages while serving in Congress.
Maas spoke on several occasions, both on Capitol Hill and directly to his
constituents, about the importance of neutrality in the face of growing international
conflict. However, he ensured that his message was disassociated with pacifism. During
one particular address before Congress, Maas explained the inherent dangers of
militaristic nations and their potential threat to world stability. Yet, Maas asserted,
instead of a pacifistic approach to international affairs, one based purely on distancing the
nation from international involvement, the US must focus on a reenergized patriotism and
support of military strength. “Pacifism has become the vogue. A patriot who advocates
Americanism is looked upon as a radical. The time has come when red blooded men and
women of the United States must stand up and proclaim it again decent to be patriotic.
Let us make being patriotic respectable and move forward under the notion of peace, not
pacifism.”98 Representative Maas continually called for an increase in military spending
and a strengthening of American defense. However, during the closing years of the
1930's, his opinions on neutrality began to shift.
When war in Europe erupted in 1939, the question of America’s role in the
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conflict began to surface. Maas steadfastly opposed any involvement in European affairs
after Hitler invaded Poland, believing the conflict to be a European problem and arguing
that American interests were not directly threatened. These views led Maas to become a
vocal challenger of the Lend Lease Act of 1941. His disagreement with Lend Lease was
not because he wanted to prevent American troops from being drawn into a second Great
War. Rather, Maas, like others in Marine Corps leadership, believed the true threat to
America lay across the Pacific Ocean.
In numerous letters and speeches, Maas pointed out the inherent dangers of the
embargo placed upon the Empire of Japan and the threat of its military might to
American installations across the Pacific. He believed that American diplomatic reactions
to Japan’s aggression toward China might lead to armed conflict. Maas’s opposition to
the Lend Lease Act was in part a desire to keep America out of European affairs, but it
was also to avoid the dilution of military assets. His contention centered around a belief
that providing military arms to nations that opposed Nazi Germany might result in the
loss of American neutrality and the inevitable deployment of troops. Should this occur,
the Japanese Empire would stand nearly unopposed in the Pacific and an outright attack
against American assets in the area could leave the nation in a compromising situation
that would be difficult to successfully navigate.
Maas argued aggressively to allocate funds for projects that would fortify
American military bases across the Pacific, most notably Guam, in order to counteract the
inherent dangers posed by Japan. Maas believed that with proper defensive upgrades and
increased garrisons, the United States could either discourage a possible attack on these
installations or at least give these assets the means for a proper defense. Despite making
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numerous requests for these projects through speeches, letters, and as a member of both
the Military and Naval Affairs Committees, Maas was unable to garner the support
needed to make any meaningful improvements, partially due to the lack of support by the
Roosevelt Administration.99
At the same time, Maas emphasized the direct threat that Japan posed to the
United States, the Marine Corps Reserve force that he had helped modernize began down
the path of mobilization. After the Naval Reserve Act of 1938, the Marine Corps Reserve
experienced a slight reduction in total force. However, once President Roosevelt declared
a Limited National Emergency on 8 September 1939, the organization quickly grew in
size. Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1914 until 1920, had a close
connection to the Department of the Navy. But in 1939, as war loomed, he developed a
personal connection to the Marine Corps and its reserves; his son James Roosevelt joined
the Marine Corps Reserves as an officer. In a letter to the MCROA President Major
Bertrand T. Fay, who had temporarily taken over for Maas, Roosevelt identified the
organization’s contributions to the armed forces during the 1930s and expressed his
admiration for its dedication and loyalty to the nation.100 As Roosevelt’s letter indicates,
the MCROA had grown from a small group of concerned officers in 1926 to one that had
significantly improved the might of naval service prior to American entry into the Second
World War. Moreover, the association that Maas founded now counted the President of
the United States among one of its many supporters.
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The Marine Corps Reserve implemented the changes put forward by the Naval
Reserve Act between 1938 and late 1940, with the majority of units quickly conducting
the required training programs put forward by the new regulations. Using newly allocated
funds, the reserve battalions attained the various aspects of training, materials, and
benefits that had been lacking throughout the 1920s and 30s. With these improvements,
the Marine Corps Reserve began preparing for the possibility of war. During the summer
of 1940, Congress stepped up its procurement of aircraft, launched a two-ocean naval
ship building program, and passed the Selective Service Act. On October 5, 1940,
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox issued a dispatch stating: “Put all organized reserve
division and aviation squadrons on short notice for call to active duty, call fleet reserves
as necessary, call retired enlisted men who may be usefully employed and who
volunteer.”101 Ten days later, this warning of activation was followed by full mobilization
through Presidential Order 8245 and Circular Letter 396. These orders placed all twentythree reserve organized battalions and thirteen reserve aviation squadrons on active duty
no later that 9 November 1940. Of the approximately 8,000 total reservists, over 85%
joined their active duty counterparts by the end of the year. Seven officers and 1,183
enlisted were disqualified physically or because going to war created a financial hardship
on the family.102
With the majority of their members activated in 1940, the MCROA chose to
temporarily suspended all activities. Soon after, the head of the Marine Corps Reserve
Policy Board, Colonel Joseph C. Fegan, retired. In his farewell address, delivered on 10
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November, Fegan expressed admiration for the newly activated reservists: “[Your]
service may take you beyond the seas; however, this call should be no news to you, as
you have been trained for and are equal to such occasions. I will follow you with pride in
your service! . . .When our national entity is being challenged, then is the time when real
Americans volunteer to serve in defense of homeland and families. You constitute this
class of Americans!”103
Once the reservists were activated, they were integrated primarily into existing
active duty units, rather than kept as individualized units as first intended. This caused a
difficult transitionary period for reservists as they attempted to adjust into units that felt
superior due to their active duty service. However, as result a of the progressive measures
made by Maas, his political allies, and the MCROA during the Interwar Period for the
improved treatment and training of marine reservists, these men proved themselves
almost immediately within the units to which they were assigned.
In 1960, Brigadier General Ronald R. Van Stockum, reflecting back on his initial
skepticism about Marine Corps Reservists upon their integration into active duty, wrote:
“I believe it was early 1940, while I was with the 6th Marines in San Diego, when the
first group of reserve officers came to active duty. I must admit that, along with a number
of my contemporaries, I considered these officers to be a somewhat inferior breed.
However, these illusions were rather quickly shattered. . . .The reservists of all the
military services distinguished themselves, and the line between the reserve and regular
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disappeared.”104 In 1965, General Charles Cogswell, a Lieutenant in the Marine Corps
Reserves in 1940, explained the difficulties faced by units who were unexpectedly
distributed into active duty units upon activation: “Confusion was rampant with
Company Commanders separated from First Sergeants and First Sergeants separated
from company clerks, and company clerks separated from muster rolls, payrolls, service
record books, et cetera.” However, Cogswell further explained that after a short
adjustment period, the Marine Reservists from his battalion who had been absorbed into
various companies quickly integrated and the “wisdom of the Marine Corps in this move
[became] evident.”105 In an interview, Marine Reserve officer, James Partridge, who went
on to become a general in the 1960s, described a similar experience as his
contemporaries. He also discussed an additional benefit of dispersing the reserves into the
Fleet Marine Force: “ Upon mobilization, [the Western Battalions] augmented every unit
of the 2nd Brigade, enabling it to acquire Division status.”106
Because he continued to fight for the modernization of the Marine Corps Reserve,
Maas was instrumental in ensuring that the force remained a viable aspect of the service
throughout the economically tight years of the Great Depression. His efforts to improve
training, increase funding, ensure payment, and extend retirement and benefits
transformed the reserves from a group held together by loyalty to the Marines, into a
viable, professional asset of the Corps. These improvements created twenty-three well
trained battalions and thirteen aviation squadrons, their professionalism explains their
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ease of integration into the Fleet Marine Force. With over a year for the reserves to adjust
to the Fleet Marine Force, the service began to grow as the limit of the force’s size was
increased to allow for new recruits to be brought in before the events of 7 December
1941.
Between 1941 to the conclusion of the war, the Marine Corps swelled to six
divisions and five air wings, totaling over 485,000 men. Sixty-eight percent of enlisted
and over eighty percent of the officers in the Marine Corps who participated in the
Pacific War were classified as reservists.107 The initial boost of the Reserve battalions
gave the Fleet Marine Force the ability to expand the service's infrastructure prior to the
influx of new recruits, allowing for new marine divisions to be formed. The improved
training allotments for marine reservists in the years leading up to their mobilization led
to an easy transition into active duty. The size of the service expanded to unprecedented
levels. As it grew with new recruits, the officers and non-commissioned officers of the
Marine Corps Reserve became a vital aspect to maintaining the standards, good order,
and discipline of the force.108
The reserves proved to be an effective medium for the recruitment and training of
Marine Corps officers who would eventually go on to become professional active duty
officers. Lt. General 'Chesty' Puller, possibly one of the most famous Marines in history
and the recipient of five Navy Crosses, began his career as a reserve officer. He
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expressed his conviction of the necessity of the Marine Corps Reserve by pointing out,
"When war comes, there will never be enough professionals to do the job."109 Puller was
by no means the only marine with a connection to the reserves to receive awards for
bravery under fire. Of the seventy-nine Marines who were awarded the Congressional
Medal of Honor, forty-four were classified as reservists. Eleven of the seventy-nine were
marines who served within the various air combat squadrons, six of whom were
reservists.110
Maas, his political allies, the Marine Corps Policy Board, and the Marine Corps
Reserve Officers Association were successful in not only ensuring that the Marine Corps
Reserve survived the Interwar Period, but also that the loyalty, esprit de corps, and
training standards were maintained. Their collective actions effectively modernized the
Marine Corps Reserve to the point that, when mobilization occurred, the force became
critical to the service. The reserve’s ability to be a cost effective augmentation to the total
men under arms, to retain veterans of active duty who may have otherwise been lost, and
to recruit those who were not ready to fully commit to four years away from professional
civilian life proved to be a vital asset to the Marine Corps.
In the summer and fall of 1941, as the Marine Corps Reserve mobilized and
amalgamated into its active duty counterparts, Maas found it nearly impossible not to join
them. That year President Roosevelt granted Maas, now a colonel, a three month leave of
absence to serve at sea as a senior staff officer for Admiral William B. Halsey aboard the
USS Enterprise in the Pacific. Upon returning to Washington in the fall, Roosevelt
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dispatched Maas to England as part of a Congressional committee assigned to study the
organization of the Royal Air Force. Because he had extensive aviation experience, Maas
was able to conduct an in-depth examination of the state of British airpower and help
generate a program for appropriate Lend Lease and Arms aid for England.111
Upon his return from England in November, the President sent Maas on an
information gathering tour of the war effort in North Africa. On December 7, while
inspecting military units fighting against the Axis Powers, he received word of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Maas immediately returned to Washington and
proceeded to make a number of personal requests to President Roosevelt to be allowed to
leave his Congressional position and join his fellow marines in the fight against the
Japanese Empire in the Pacific. After several months, President Roosevelt approved his
request for a leave of absence and Maas was sent to the Pacific to serve upon the USS
Saratoga.
By the time Maas joined the Pacific War as an active participant, his efforts to
create an improved Marine Reserve were realized. The men of the Marine Corps Reserve
were successfully mobilized and effectively bolstered the strength of their active duty
counterparts. Unfortunately, Maas’s call for adequate preparations for a possible war
against Japan had not been realized by the time the United States was dragged into the
conflict. His stance of peace through a strengthened military failed to prevent American
entry into the Second World War. Once war was declared, Maas was quick to join his
fellow marines in the Pacific Theater. Through his persistence in creating a modern
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Marine Corps Reserve in the 1930s, the Marine Corps, and the nation, were more
prepared than they would have been if the Marine Reserve had been left to die on the
vine during its tenuous early years. As Maas left to join his fellow battle brothers in the
Pacific, he would participate in his second global conflict as a marine and his experiences
hardened his resolve for his final battle as a Congressman—a battle on Capitol Hill for
the very existence of the Marine Corps.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MAAS, THE SECOND WORLD WAR,
AND THE FIGHT FOR THE MARINE CORPS

As Melvin Maas embarked on his second global war as a United States Marine,
he continued his life as part-politician, part-military officer. His experiences in the
Second World War placed him in much greater danger than his duty on submarine patrols
as a corporal. However, Maas's time in the Pacific provided him with valuable first-hand
knowledge of the conflict. Maas participated in the invasion of Guadalcanal, served as a
liaison with General Douglas MacArthur in Australia, and conducted a number of
reconnaissance flights throughout the Pacific before being called back to his
Congressional duties. He received numerous awards for his military service during the
Pacific War. Upon his return to Washington, he was responsible for changing the course
of a reorganization of the American military that threatened to place the Marine Corps in
danger of being absorbed by the War Department.
After being granted a leave of absence from Congress by President Roosevelt,
Col. Maas reported for active duty at Camp Pendleton, California, in June 1942. Once
there, Maas was assigned to a small marine detachment aboard the USS Saratoga, then
far out in the Pacific. He served under Admiral Frank J. Fletcher in the Solomon Islands
throughout the first island-hopping engagements of the Pacific War. During these
aggressive actions toward the Japanese assets in the Pacific, the 1st Marine Division
conducted seaborne landings on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and several smaller islands. The
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Japanese launched fierce counteroffensives against all the Allied forces, pouring
reinforcements into Guadalcanal, bombing and strafing from the air, and sinking Allied
cruisers. It was a bloody, costly operation for both sides. The Japanese were defeated in a
two-day naval battle in November but final Allied victory did not come until midFebruary 1943 when the final pockets of resistance were eliminated.112
Although the congressman’s orders dictated that he stay out of the various combat
zones whenever possible, it was not enough for Maas to be a protected observer. He
wanted to take a direct role in combat operations. President Roosevelt, concerned that
Col. Maas might be killed in the line of duty, ordered the congressman to return to
Washington. However, Maas used the confusion of military bureaucracy to his
advantage. He was able to evade receiving the Presidential order for months, thus
enabling him to continue taking part in the fight against Japan. In the early fall of 1942,
Col. Maas was participating in the New Guinea campaign when Roosevelt’s orders
finally caught up with him. Before he was sent back to Washington, he received an Army
Silver Star by the command of General Douglas MacArthur. This citation for the nation’s
third highest honor identified Maas’s “gallantry in action over New Guinea on September
3, 1942.”113 The award goes on to recognize Maas’s “voluntary and aggressive effort . . .
to assist in any capacity in the combat reconnaissance of an important area occupied by
the enemy [and] is worthy of the finest tradition of our fighting forces.”114 Maas later
recalled a verbal rebuke attached to his Silver Star award. MacArthur reprimanded him
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for engaging in aerial combat when he was merely supposed to be acting as an observer
and for risking government property by using a medium bomber as a dive bomber to
strafe the enemy airfield.115 The Silver Star added to the personal collection of awards
and decorations Maas acquired during his service.116
In late September 1942, Colonel Maas returned to Washington to resume his
Congressional duties. During the next year, as a member of the House Committee on
Naval Affairs, he fought for further naval appropriations and introduced legislation that
allowed female units within the Marine Corps. Over 300 female Marines had served in
the Corps during World War I, yet the service continued to retain a generally male-only
stance.117 In addition, Maas sponsored legislation to give officer ratings to all nurses on
active duty in the American Armed Forces. Maas’s initial thrust for sexual equality put
him at odds with Commandant Thomas Holcomb. General Holcomb believed that Maas
had done a great disservice to the Marine Corps, telling Maas personally that his actions
would be the ruin of the service. Holcomb considered female integration erosive to the
male dominated service’s identity. Subsequently Holcomb, who had been a longtime
friend of Maas, cut off all personal ties.118
As Maas fought for the introduction of women into the Marine Corps, and for
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greater naval appropriations, a new threat to the Marine Corps began to emerge. In late
1942, the Joint Chief of Staff (JSC) created an ad hoc committee, the Joint Strategic
Survey Command (JSSC), for the purpose of studying how to conduct the Second World
War in a more effective manner. The committee set out to solve questions regarding the
roles and missions of the various military branches in order to improve aspects that were
viewed as lacking by a portion of defense and civilian leadership. On November 2, 1943,
General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, submitted a memorandum to the
JCS that called for a single defense department, effectively eliminating the separation
between the individual services. From Marshall's perspective, the new organizational
structure constituted a massive cost reduction for taxpayers and provided a unified
command. Marshall contended that under a single department, the military would benefit
from a greater execution of policies and be assured greater access to the President.119
A combined military department was not a new concept to Marshall or the War
Department. Within the Army, the idea of a unified defense had been circulating since the
early decades of the twentieth century. The Root Reforms of 1903 greatly improved the
Army’s internal operations, and many within its leadership felt that the War
Department’s particular take on organization should be applied to all aspects of the
military. All plans submitted by the War Department for military reorganization between
1944 and 1947 reflected the War Department’s internal organization. Furthermore,
Marshall himself had been tasked by President Roosevelt with forming preliminary plans
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for combined defense as early as 1940.120 The War Department believed that by
aggressively seizing the initiative during the unification debates, they could overpower
the Department of the Navy, which had put far less thought into postwar defense
planning. If Marshall and the War Department were successful, they could shape postwar
defense in a manner that would be highly beneficial to the Army’s eventual role at the
detriment of the Department of the Navy.121
Marshall sent his proposal to the JSSC and the JCS formed a special committee to
debate his suggestions. Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Staff of Naval Operations,
disapproved of Marshall's ideas, viewing them as a direct threat to the Department of the
Navy. Foreseeing a potential political fight against military unification on the horizon,
Admiral King insisted that the new committee investigate not only Marshall's plan for a
single department, but also the pros and cons of one department, two departments (Army
and Navy), and three departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Marshall reluctantly
agreed to King's demands, and the committee set out to study the possible effects of
different organizational systems.122
On March 8, 1944, the JSSC submitted its findings, “Reorganization and National
Defense,” to the JCS. The report stated that every effort should be made toward the
attainment of the idea of a single military service, but that the goal was more than likely
impractical except during early training of new service members and at the highest level
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of command. When examining the role of the Marines, the JSSC did not believe that the
Corps was a duplication of effort, but rather that its role in national defense would more
than likely remain relevant in post-war defense. The JSSC proposed the creation of
another committee to be formed to investigate the matter in greater depth.
Later that month, spurred by the request of further investigation by the JSSC,
Representative James W. Wadsworth Jr. of New York introduced a resolution calling for
the establishment of a select committee on postwar military policy. The resolution passed
on 28 March 1944. Representative Clifton Woodrum chaired the new committee now
named the Woodrum Committee. This committee included twenty-three representatives:
seven from the House Military and Naval Committees and nine members from the Senate
Military Affairs Committee. Maas, as the most senior member of the House Committee
on Naval Affairs, was included.123
The Woodrum Committee Hearings served as the first detailed expression of the
War Department's desire for military unification. Every Congressman associated with the
War Department, whether he sat on either the House or the Senate's Committee on
Military Affairs, favored full unification of the armed services. Woodrum himself also
favored the War Department's aim for the reorganization of American defense. Those
opposed, led by former Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, were Representatives
Walter Andrews from New York, Carl Vinson from Georgia, and Melvin Maas. With the
supporters of the Navy Department outnumbered, the War Department began its attempt
to steamroll its agenda through the committee hearings, and perceivably into law, within
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a very short time frame.124
The Woodrum Committee Hearings began on April 24, 1944. The Director of the
War Department's Special Planning Division explained that the department had been
working on efforts to unify the military services since early 1942. Citing a number of
studies, the Director argued that a single defense department would help create a more
economical approach to military affairs in the postwar era and the unity of command that
it could provide would eliminate a number of operational difficulties then facing combat
troops in Europe and the Pacific. Following the Director of Special Planning, Secretary of
War Stimson testified that good will and the quality of the military leaders at the time
were responsible for the successful coordination of the war up to that point, not the
organizational framework in which they operated. He claimed that while this might be
working in the current war, it should not be relied upon to function successfully in the
future. Furthermore, Secretary Stimson stressed, the reorganization must follow the
fundamentals put forward by the War Department's studies and address the details after
the plan was put into place.125
The following day, April 25, Lt. Gen. Joseph McNarney unveiled the War
Department's full reorganization plan. Under this plan, the Army and the Navy would be
joined by an independent Air Force under the control of a new Secretary of the Armed
Forces. In addition, each of the branches would lose its cabinet level secretaries in favor
of under secretaries beneath the newly established Armed Forces Secretary. The Joint
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Chiefs of Staff would be retained as an advisory element to the President, but the Marine
Corps, which had no representation, remained excluded. Questions quickly arose
regarding points of contention that became the hallmark of the debate surrounding
unification: allocation of air assets amongst the services, the post-war role of the Marine
Corps, and the War Department's intention to quickly put the plan in place and work out
the details in future legislation.126
Upon his unveiling of the War Department's plan for reorganization, Rep. Maas
questioned Lt. Gen. McNarney. Convinced that the plan lacked a specific place for the
Marine Corps, Maas expressed doubt concerning the General’s arguments. When Maas
pressed the issue of the distribution of air assets among the armed services, McNarney
declined to comment and chose to defer further air related inquiries to Assistant Secretary
of War for Air, Robert Lovett.127
When Assistant Secretary Lovett testified, he pleaded for a separate air force. He
believed that the proposed branch should include all land-based aerial assets, including
naval aviation that was based on land. Lovett believed that combining all land-based
aircraft under a single branch would save the taxpayers a tremendous amount and the
force would benefit from a coordinated command structure. He contended that the
Marine Corps and its amphibious operations were a duplication of the Army and that the
branch should be either dissolved or relegated to guarding naval posts. After Assistant
Secretary Lovett concluded his arguments for the adoption of the McNarney Plan, the
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questioning began and was immediately taken over by Rep. Maas.128
Relying on his extensive knowledge of airpower, naval affairs, and the Marine
Corps, Maas adeptly dismantled Lovett’s views of post war reorganization. Maas agreed
that an independent air force should be created, but argued that the Navy must retain their
control over both sea and land based aircraft responsible for successful naval operations.
Maas then vehemently defended his service, the Marine Corps, and its inherent and
unique value to American defense both prior to and during the Second World War.
Maas’s actions blunted the initial aspirations of the War Department to create a single
defense department in their image.129
After listening to more War Department advocates for unification throughout the
25th, the committee convened and met three days later, on April 28. Caught off guard and
under siege by the War Department's years of planning, the Department of the Navy
began its rebuttal. Undersecretary of the Navy James Forrestal argued the Navy's point of
view toward the proposal, pointing out that it was dangerous to move forward with the
massive reorganization under the conviction that the problems that would inevitably arise
could be solved after the process began. Forrestal argued that in order to determine the
best possible structural changes, detailed studies must first be conducted by the
Department of the Navy and further examination of potential problems must be
accounted for by the War Department, thus necessitating further research on its part.
The debate over the McNarney Plan continued throughout most of May 1944.
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First, the Department of the Navy defended its role in the current defense system in great
detail. Next, Marine Corps Commandant Alexander Vandergrift explained the
importance of his service. His testimony was followed by those of other naval
representatives who stressed the importance of naval aviation and the need to retain all
aspects of it to remain a viable component to sea power. All of these testimonies pushed
for further investigations into the potential effects, both positive and negative, of military
unification. The hearings concluded on May 19 with the testimonies of Budget Director
Harold Smith, Representatives James W. Wadsworth Jr., and Jennings Randolph of West
Virginia, all of whom pressed for immediate unification of the armed services to increase
effectiveness, lower the defense budget by cutting unnecessary duplication, and resolving
internal frictions among the branches.
The same day that the Woodrum Committee Hearings concluded, Secretary of the
Navy Frank Knox unexpectedly died from a heart attack. James Forestall succeeded
Knox in the position. As Secretary of the Navy, Forestall believed that due to lack of
preparation, the Navy had been unable to effectively promote its views regarding
reorganization. With a relatively lackluster performance by naval advocates during the
hearings, Forestall was positive that, had the issue been brought to a Congressional or
public poll, the War Department would win. Were the plan to be enacted, it was possible
that the War Department would push for an overall Secretary of the Armed Forces that
would strip the Navy of essential assets, including a portion of its airpower and possibly
the Marine Corps. In addition, Forestall feared that the War Department's approach to the
situation of unify now, work out the potential issues later, could lead to a series of
organizational changes that would greatly diminish the Navy's budget and importance in
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postwar defense.130
The fight over military unification raged on for another three years, with common
ground found within the National Security Act of 1947. The 1947 Act finally combined
the War Department, Navy Department, and the new Air Force Department within a
single Defense Department.131 The Marine Corps was included within the new
organizational structure, but not guaranteed an adequate size until 1952. While the
postwar Marine Corps would not have to worry about further attacks upon its existence,
as it had throughout its history, such security would not have been possible without the
efforts of pro-naval and Marine Corps advocates, including Rep. Melvin Maas. Using his
political position as the senior member of the House Committee of Naval Affairs, years
of service to the Corps, and his vast knowledge of airpower, he helped alter the course of
the early unification debates during the Woodrum Committee Hearings. The path he laid
down ensured that the Department of the Navy and its Marine Corps would have ample
time to mount a political offensive against the War Department’s vision of military
reorganization. However, Maas did not participate in any further committees or debates
surrounding reorganization. In fact, the Woodrum Committee was one of the last times he
represented the people of Minnesota as a member of Congress.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: MAAS, OKINAWA,
AND THE POSTWAR RESERVES

Maas’s passion for the improvement of naval affairs created friction with the
Roosevelt Administration. Although Roosevelt had been a longtime supporter of the
Navy, Maas was convinced that the President’s treatment of the Pacific War lacked
focus. Maas’s disapproval of the Administration’s approach to the Pacific Theater
became apparent to his constituents in 1944. This stance was unpopular with the majority
of voters from his district and ultimately cost the Congressman his seat in the House of
Representatives. No longer attached to his legislative duties, Maas chose to rejoin his
fellow marines in the final push toward victory against Japan. Despite the loss of his
Congressional seat, Maas’s role within the MCROA allowed him to continue to
aggressively promote the Marine Corps Reserve in the postwar years. His efforts helped
create the needed legislation to lay the foundations for the modern Marine Corps Reserve,
finally completing his lifelong work.
Representative Maas had been a harsh critic of the Roosevelt Administration. As
a member of the Naval Affairs Committee during the Interwar Period, he fought to
increase funding for the Navy, specifically the Pacific Fleet. He remained a strong
advocate for airpower and warned of the potential dangers that enemy air forces posed to
American land bases and naval ports. In addition, he repeatedly identified the Japanese
Empire as a clear and present threat to American assets in the Pacific. Maas blamed the
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Administration directly for the disaster at Pearl Harbor contending that he, along with
other like-minded Congressmen, had adequately warned of an impending crisis with
Japan only to be ignored by the Roosevelt Administration. To compound his frustrations,
Maas felt that the Pacific War was receiving far less attention from members of the
Administration who concentrated their efforts in Europe, thus endangering the potential
success in the Pacific Theater. Maas took advantage of his untraditional role of being
both a military officer and an elected official to step beyond the chain of command of a
uniformed member of the Armed Services. Even though, as a marine officer, Roosevelt
was his Commander-in-chef, Maas publicly denounced the President and his handling of
the war. In one instance for example, Maas stated to a reporter: “[America is] losing the
Pacific [War].” He went on to add his contention that the Roosevelt Administration was
intentionally deceiving the public regarding the state of the war against Japan. Maas
believed that this deception was intended to retain public support for the Administration
and its policies.132
Maas’s public criticism of Roosevelt was met with angry letters from many of his
constituents who were outraged with his claims. This is evident in a letter from the
President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in response to a October 28, 1944,
speech by Maas in which he accused Roosevelt of willfully leading the US into war
against Japan by intentionally leaving Pearl Harbor vulnerable to attack. In the letter, the
union’s leader states: “Your statement is vicious, wholly unwarranted, is not supported by
facts, and in my opinion no patriotic American citizen would stoop to such a low level as
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to make a statement of that kind about the President of the United States or any other
patriotic American Citizen. Let me say to you sir, that the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen resent your unholy statement and your vicious and malicious insinuations, and
we have this date officially endorsed your opponent.”133 Later that month, Maas told a
crowd, "If you are going to vote for Roosevelt, don't vote for me."134 The majority of his
constituents heeded his ultimatum, voting him out of office on November 7, 1944. Maas
was not the only politician who criticized Roosevelt during the war, but some of his more
outlandish statements inferred that Roosevelt was involved in a conspiracy regarding the
events of December 7, 1941. Moreover, most of the media coverage of his statements
acknowledged that he was a colonel in the Marine Corps. One could conclude that this
type of public criticism coming from a high ranking military officer compromised the
good order and discipline of the Armed Services during the latter half of World War II.
However, as bombastic as Maas’s statements were, there is no evidence that Maas was
ever officially reprimanded by his chain of command.
Following his political defeat, Maas applied for active duty and by the middle of
May 1945 he was bound for the Pacific. Col. Maas arrived by plane at Okinawa Shima in
the Ryukyus for special aviation duty with the Commander of the Naval Air Base. He
later assumed command of the Kadena Airfield, the operational airbase for the 2nd
Marine Air Wing, on May 25, replacing the previous commander who was suffering from
combat related stress. Once in command, Maas coordinated close air support missions
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against organized Japanese resistance on the island before the fighting was finally quelled
on June 21. According to one report that Maas submitted, “Though actual casualties from
enemy air attacks were comparatively light due to the splendid work of our fighters and
the heroic part played by ships assigned near picket stations, enemy aircraft succeeded in
strafing and bombing both Yontan and Kadena strips frequently.”135 If his command of
Kadena Field had been rather uneventful, his appointment to Awase Airfield on July 11
was not. There, the forty-seven year old sustained facial and leg wounds during an air
assault by Japanese aircraft, thereby earning him a Purple Heart. Unfortunately, what
seemed to be superficial wounds eventually had far-reaching consequences.
Maas ended his term of service at Awase on August 16, two days after the end of
hostilities. For his outstanding record on Okinawa, Maas received a Legion of Merit with
a Combat “V.”136 In addition to the Legion of Merit, Maas also earned the Asiatic-Pacific
Campaign Medal with four bronze stars, a World War II Victory Medal, and a
Presidential Unit Citation for his service with the 2nd Marine Air Wing.137
Commandant Vandergrift recalled Maas from Okinawa back to the United States
to supervise the demobilization of over 38,000 Marine Corps officers. Once relieved of
active duty, he rejoined the Marine Corps Reserve and reestablished the MCROA, which
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had remained in trusteeship during the war. Maas used his position as an overseer of the
demobilization to try to bolster recruitment for both the Marine Corps Reserve and the
MCROA.
General Vandergrift, a longtime friend of Maas, saluted the efforts of Marine
Reservists during the Pacific War with a postwar commendation that stated: “During
World War II, Marine Reserves constituting the bulk of the Marine Corps, had a major
share in its wartime achievements. Unfailingly they demonstrated the esprit de corps
which is the heritage of all Marines.”138 Vandergrift believed that the future of the Marine
Corps in the postwar era depended upon a strong partnership in which the regulars and
reserves cooperated to achieve “a continuous program of military efficiency.”139
In his role in demobilization, and as the head of the MCROA, Maas continued to
use every means available to ensure that the Marine Corps Reserve maintained a high
standard in the months following the end of the war. As his fellow officer and reserve
activist Colonel Clark W. Thompson observed: “[Maas] pushed papers, banged desks and
fought the memo battles of Marine Corps Headquarters in providing the necessary
transition from a wartime to a peacetime Corps in which reservists, finally, would be
trained, equipped, and provided the necessary opportunities to serve their country.”140
Maas’s efforts resulted in a number of benefits for the Marine Corps Reserve and the
service as a whole. New recruits and veterans alike began joining the Marine Reserve.
The reserves established a well-balanced system of modern engineer, signal, artillery,
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tank, and amtrac units. Proper funding allowed these units to drill accordingly, fire on
rifle ranges, and handle military vehicles as they strived to keep their skills at the peak
level of alert readiness.
During the time Maas was working to ensure proper training for the reserves, he
received word from his political contacts that after the National Defense Act of 1947
there were still a number of influential politicians questioning the viability of the Marine
Corps in the nuclear age. With improved nuclear technologies and the growing support
for the newly-founded Air Force, a strong component within both the military and
Congress doubted the need for a branch of service dedicated to amphibious operations.
Airpower advocates, believing in the outright devastation that could be wrought by
nuclear weapons delivered from the air, concluded that a seaborne invasion of a nation
that was nuclear capable would not only be impossible, but utterly disastrous if
attempted. While the Marine Corps was applauded for their service against the Japanese
Empire in the Pacific, a growing number of policymakers were beginning to subscribe to
the idea that amphibious operations could never be conducted again.
Colonel Maas took to the pages of the MCROA’s Word to defend the Marine
Corps against its detractors and to remind those who worried for the Corps’ future that
the Marines were well represented on Capitol Hill: “The MCROA never wavered in its
battle to ensure the integrity of the Marine Corps and to preserve its vital functions by
law. Even while others in high places yielded to the pressure from the Administration and
Army supporters, the MCROA stood fast and held the line.”141 Maas continued his
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statement by pointing out how the Department of the Army used a “weasel-worded
provision to the effect that the Marine Corps was not to be distributed in its relative
position—whatever that meant.”142 He reminded his readers that there were twelve
MCROA members in the House and Senate and that the service’s supporters could “go
forward now with confidence that the Marine Corps is not going to be abolished nor
whittled down by insidious campaigns from inside nor outside the other military
branches.”143
During the same period that Maas worked to improve the postwar reserves and
defend the Marine Corps, he also served on a committee to help recommend new
legislation relating to the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve. Acting as a Congressional
advisor, he aided in the crafting of Public Law 810, the first legislative measure that
provided longevity retirement pay for reserve officers who had completed duty worthy of
recompense. The first marine to receive the benefits of the law was Harvey L. Miller,
who had served in the regular and reserve services of both the Navy and Marine Corps
for more than forty years.
Maas and the MCROA viewed the reserves as not only a vital component to
having an effective Marine Corps, but also essential to its survival for nearly two
decades. Their continued advocation for the reserves had been hard fought, despite
lackluster and sporadic attention for the organization from Headquarters prior to 1940.
However, in 1948, as the House Appropriations Committee and members of Congress
began contemplating slashing the service’s budget as a cost saving measure,
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Commandant Vandergrift employed the reserves for political ends. He turned to the
reserves as a way to bolster the branch’s numbers to both demonstrate the devotion of
former marines to the Corps, and to help ensure that if a national emergency were to
happen the reserves could help support an adequate response. In an appeal to marine
veterans, Vandergrift stated: “We are calling upon the men whose courage helped smash
the enemy at Guadalcanal, at Tarawa, at Iwo Jima, and at Okinawa, to provide an attack
force to seize one more beachhead.”144 He pointed out the value of the reserves in the
postwar era stating, “If war should come, the men of the Organized Reserve, trained in
the latest tactics and techniques, and armed with the latest weapons, will be ready to join
with their comrades of the Fleet Marine Force in manning the nation’s first line of
defense.”145 Between the Commandant’s plea and the repeated efforts by Maas, his
fellow marine reservists, and the MCROA, the Secretary of the Navy’s report for 1948
fiscal year indicated that the Marine Reserve units were fully trained in basic military
subjects, were supplied with adequate amounts of organizational equipment, and
therefore capable of integrating into regular forces within one month.
1949 served as a decisive year for the Marine Corps and the Defense Department.
After two years, the newly unified military adapted to reorganization and the advent of
advances in military technology. These adjustments resulted in increasing levels of interservice tension as budgets and strategies were reformed to confront the realities of the
postwar era. As the military departments fought for larger allocations from the defense
budget, the future of the Marine Corps was again called into question. Many of these

144

Vandegrift, Once a Marine, 117.

145

Ibid, 117.

95
questions were addressed at the yearly military conference held by the MCROA on
January 29 in Chicago. Maas, as one of the cofounders of the MCORA, was invited to
speak. When Maas reached the podium to address the gathering, which had both the
Commandant and the Director of Reserve in attendance, he stated, “Never in history was
there a greater need for unity, loyalty, and selfless leadership, yet we meet today faced
with dissension, backbiting and, frequently, a leadership of selfishness and greed even in
our own military forces. Our enemies couldn’t, by design, set the stage for their purpose
better than we ourselves are doing.”146 Maas then challenged his audience: “What do they
see? Still all too much of a mad scramble to either hold blindly to outmoded traditions
and weapons, or to greedily reach out and grab control of the weapons, personnel, and
funds of sister military services, as if the battle were among themselves, instead of a
common enemy.”147 He reminded the attendees that “bickering, backbiting, and sly
undercutting, exaggerated claims, slurs, and ill-concealed hostility among too many
professional military leaders of all ranks are causing disgust among Americans and the
gleeful jubilation among our enemies.”148
During his discourse, Maas pointed out other hindrances to a proper American
defense when he explained that this type of behavior extended into elements of the
Marine Corps itself. He argued that it was counterproductive for regulars to view
reservists as outsiders, and that some officers’ view that the reserve battalions were full
of rank seekers, and that the existence of the battalions constituted a parasite on active
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duty appropriations, weakened the service in its time of need. Reservists were not
immune to Maas’s criticisms either. During the address, he pointed out that too many
reservists possessed a negative view of all regulars as brass hats, only interested in
holding down the Marine Corps Reserves. Maas contended that much of this intra-service
tension was due to “imperfections in the unification law itself” as well as to the
unyielding attitudes of too many members of the service.149
These imperfections with the unification law, and the dangers they posed to the
future of the Corps, are famously summarized in the article “The Marine Corps Fights
For Its Life,” which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post on February 5, 1949. Richard
Tregaskis, who had been a military correspondent embedded with the First Marine
Division during World War II, describes the perilous partisanship the Corps found itself
in: “Of the never-ending problems which face the Corps, the most grievous is being the
Marines’ struggle to survive as a fighting unit. The Marines have been the proudest,
sharpest American fighting unit for the longest time, the Marine training schools seem
capable of inculcating the fiercest esprit de corps—but if the Commandant and his
advisers were not alert, they might awake some morning to find that the whole glorious
structure had been pulverized by some legislative or administrative blitz.”150 Tregaskis
explains that the opponents of the Marine Corps were “mostly Army and Air Force
enthusiasts who have long hankered to chop the Marine Corps into nothingness—or
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worst to a marine—to change it into just another army unit.”151 The threat to the Marine
Corps was obvious throughout the first months of 1949. Army Secretary Kenneth Royal
stated publicly that the Secretary of Defense should be able to transfer the Marine Corps
to the Army if he saw fit, and Senator Tydings of Maryland helped by sponsoring Senate
Bill 1269. The bill made Royal’s opinion on the Defense Secretary’s power a reality, and
in turn placed the Marine Corps in a constant state of perpetual danger of being dissolved.
With the strong presence of Navy supporters, and the influence of MCROA
members within Congress, Bill 1269 failed to make meaningful headway. Yet, as 1949
continued to unfold, the fight for the future of the Marine Corps persisted, this time
directly from the top echelon of the Army, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur had
employed the Marines within his military campaigns in the South Pacific, but according
to Maas, who received his Silver Star directly from the iconic general, MacArthur had
spoken to him openly about wanting to absorb the service. MacArthur told Maas that he
believed that bringing the Corps into the Army would introduce an injection of inimitable
Marine spirit into its ranks. Maas did not share his enthusiasm, considering it as an open
threat to his chosen military service.152
Following his conversation with MacArthur, Maas, in his role as the president of
the MCROA, once again took to the stage of various military conferences to defend the
Corps. In October 1949, he warned a military gathering in Philadelphia:
Our history indicates, that if the Marine Corps is destroyed as a combat
organization, we are likely to enter World War III largely with weapons, tactics,
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and techniques developed to fight World War II. They will not be enough to win
any future war. The current movement to preserve the Marine Corps as an
integrated, well-equipped striking force is basically neither service rivalry nor
pride in the Corps, but the deep convictions of people with knowledge that we
must have what the Corps can give the nation in order to survive as a democratic
nation.153
Maas also pressed for increased Marine representation on the JCS: “The law must
provide that the Commandant of the Marine Corps sit with the Joint Chiefs during
consideration of amphibious matters and on all other matters affecting the Marine
Corps.”154
As debate over the Marine Corps’ place within the Defense Department continued
to grind into 1950, Soviet-equipped Communist troops from North Korea invaded their
southern neighbor. Once the United States entered the conflict, the value of the Marine
Corps and its reserves were again clarified in the face of their detractors. The state of
readiness of both the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve at the outbreak of war
again demonstrated the importance of the exhaustive efforts of Maas and the MCROA.
When the call for mobilization came, the Marine Corps, both regular and reserves,
sprung into action. Over 90% of the officers and enlisted personnel in the Marine Reserve
reported for active duty within the 43-day activation period that followed the official
orders issued on July 21, 1950. By the Inchon-Seoul Operations in the fall of that year,
there were more marines in the Far East than there had been in the entire Fleet Marine
Force two months earlier. At the end of 1951, the Marine Corps was three times its
prewar size, with more than forty-five per cent of the total strength coming from the
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reserve.155
The strategic role of the Marine Corps, clarified by the Korean Conflict and the
landings at Inchon, proved that amphibious operations were still possible in the postWorld War II era, thus aiding the Marine Corps in obtaining permanent status within the
Department of Defense. This was carried forward by a group of former marines, marine
reservists, and members of the MCROA including Senator Paul Douglas (Illinois) and
Senator Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Montana). These pro-Marine legislators were
able to secure a permanent place for the Marine Corps on June 28, 1952, as the Marine
Corps Bill, Report Number 666, was signed into law by President Truman.156 Colonel
Tom Wert described the passing of the Marine Corps Bill as the “Magna Carta” of the
service. He explained, “The Marine Corps could have been dissolved by any President by
executive order. This Act, however, gave to the Marine Corps a legal standing and
recognition, established a minimum strength of three divisions and three air wings and
gave the Commandant membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The part it played in the
development and enactment of this legislation has been one of the MCROA’s outstanding
achievements to date for both Corps and country.”157
By the end of 1952, the Marine Corps had finally secured its permanent position
within American defense. Its reserve had once again proven its value as an asset to the
regular force in times of service-wide mobilization. The active duty component was able
to expand its ranks with well trained marine reservists, some of whom had extensive
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combat experience, in order to meet the challenges presented to the service. While the
Marine Corps Reserve continually improved throughout the following decades, Maas
played a diminishing a role. He had been promoted to Brigadier General on June 1, 1950,
and awarded the Armed Forces Reserve Medal and the National Defense Service Medal.
Upon his retirement in 1952, Maas was promoted to the rank of Major General. By the
mid-1950s, complications from the facial injuries Maas sustained on Okinawa resulted in
the steady loss of his sight. Before going completely blind, Maj. Gen. Maas stepped down
from his position as the President of the MCROA, a post he had served in since the
inception of the organization, and retired from the reserves.
Maas’s blindness and retirement did not prohibit him from aiding in the
development of two more pieces of legislation that finalized his lifelong endeavor to
modernize the reserve forces of the United States. Acting as a legislative advisor, Maas
helped draw up the provisions for the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the
Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 in collaboration with the Armed Forces Reserve
Policy Board of the Defense Department, the officers of the Reserve Officers
Association, and the Executive Council of the MCROA. With the two bills passed, all
reserve forces within the Department of Defense were able to practice the policies and
regulations put upon them with uniformity, thus creating the beginning of the modern
reserve system.
Although blind, Maas continued to serve on various advisory committees and
promotion boards for the Marine Corps, and remained an active member of the MCROA
for the rest of his life. With the future of the Marine Corps and the modernization of the
future reserve secured, Maas turned his attentions to another equally important issue: the
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treatment of the disabled. He became the spokesman for veterans and non-veterans alike
who suffered from physical and mental handicaps. Maas dedicated the remainder of his
life to ensure equal treatment and employment for the disabled, helping to pass the first
legislative efforts for equal access and employment rights. Maas died of heart failure on
April 13, 1964, and was laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery three days later.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

By the 19th century, leadership within the American Armed Forces had identified
the need for a modern reserve. The Department of the Navy and the War Department
independently established their reserve systems before American entry into the First
World War. However, these systems lacked a number of essential provisions and, in the
case of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve, resulted in a steady decline of their potential
effectiveness. By the late 1920s, the Department of the Navy’s alterations to its reserve
programs rectified a number of the problems not addressed in the initial legislation that
had created them. However, the modifications made to the Naval Reserve did not
completely solve the initial shortfalls. While there is little doubt that the entire reserve
system would have survived the Interwar Period, evidence suggests that it would not have
been able to modernize as quickly, or as effectively, without the efforts of Melvin Maas,
his unique position as marine officer and legislator, and the Marine Corps Reserve
Officers Association he cofounded.
Maas’s impact on the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves is undeniable. His total
devotion to the Corps, developed as an enlisted during the First World War, continued
during his service in the reserves. When he accepted his commission as a reserve officer,
the Marine Reserve was a fledgling organization lacking proper funding and training, and
unable to attract proper attention from the upper echelons of leadership. Maas identified
the need for improved political representation for the reserves and subsequently
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organized a special interest group, the MCROA. He used his presidency of this group in
conjunction with his position as a member of Congress to advocate for the advancement
of the reserves. Maas went on to garner further influence within Congress during the
Interwar Period. Because the Congressman had experienced the difficulties faced by
reservists first hand, he was able to utilize this personal knowledge and translate it into
highly effective legislation. The legislation that Maas was able to pass throughout the
course of the 1930s produced a flexible and useful Marine and Naval Reserve. Maas was
a valuable political asset to the Marine Corps during the 1930s, even fending off an attack
agains the service’s existence. He also fought to secure increased funding for the
Department of the Navy, and by default the Marine Corps, and continually crusaded for
the interests of national defense prior to the Second World War.
Once the war with Japan broke out, Maas chose to take a leave of absence from
his Congressional duties and join his fellow marines. During his tour of duty, he
conducted a number of combat missions before he was recalled to his seat in the House of
Representatives by President Roosevelt. Back in Washington, Maas joined the
bureaucratic fight over military reorganization—a battle that eventually granted the
Marine Corps a permanent place in American defense.
Maas played a role in the initial debates surrounding the unification of the armed
forces, his extensive first hand knowledge of naval operations, the Marine Corps, and
American airpower, made him one of, if not the most influential member of the military
committee created to examine the War Department’s 1944 proposal. By quickly
dispatching a number of pro-War Department advocates’ testimonies early in the debates,
Maas was able to weaken the initial aims of those who wished to railroad the McNarney
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Plan into law before the end of World War II. As a result, he and other legislators who
supported the Department of the Navy succeeded in allowing further examinations into
defense unification. The debates that followed provided the Navy and the Marine Corps
the needed time to counter the efforts of the War Department, eventually leading to
legislation that offered a more balanced approach between all of the services.
Even after losing his seat in the House of Representatives in 1944, he fought on
for an improved reserve system and the survival of the Marine Corps. By the time Maas
retired from the Marine Corps in 1952, he had risen to the rank of major general and had
crafted a reserve system that was adopted by all the branches of the military. The forward
momentum that he created for the improvement of the reserves throughout his time in
Congress continued well past the end of his political career, resulting in the modern
system. Moreover, by 1952, the MCROA, an organization he helped create, had
numerous members in both the House and the Senate, thus granting the Marine Corps
more political sway than ever before in its history. This increased influence within the
legislative branch helped the Marine Corps, once on constant guard for its continued
existence, to obtain permanence through law.
Maas and his lifelong political agenda are products of the First World War. He,
along with thousands of other young American men, abruptly left their civilian life to
serve their country and prove themselves in the face of combat. His choice of service
forged him into a dedicated marine and an advocate for the Department of the Navy.
During his service, Maas witnessed the emergence of the aircraft as a weapon of war and
his experiences within one of the first marine aviation squadrons altered his vision of the
future of warfare and American military might. Furthermore, Maas’s commissioning into
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the Marine Corps Reserve in the decade following World War I illuminated the
seriousness of the issues facing the early reserve system and helped him recognize the
potential importance of a well-trained, regulated, and administered reserve system to
American defense.
Maas was elected to the House of Representatives a few short months after
becoming a Marine Reserve officer. Utilizing his first-hand knowledge of the Marine
Corps, military aviation, and the reserve program, he proceeded to campaign for the
strengthening of all three during the Interwar Period—a period marked by military
innovation of thought and technology, but also a period burdened with a severe economic
downturn. Undaunted by the political and economic atmosphere of his times, Maas used
his growing political clout and the MCROA to help provide for a well-financed Navy
Department, improved airpower within the services, and the development of a flexible
and effective naval reserve component that could be called into service should the need
arise.
World War II demonstrated the need and effectiveness of all three aspects of
Maas’s political agenda. The Marine Corps and an empowered Department of the Navy
defeated Japan in the Pacific War, airpower became an indispensable aspect of combat
operations, and the reserve components of all the services proved themselves to be a vital
asset to the war effort. Therefore, Maas’s support of the issues he viewed as important,
based off his experiences in and directly following the First World War, were realized in
the following global conflict. His fight for political advancement of them aided in
America’s successful participation in World War II.
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In the years following the Second World War, membership and the political clout
of the MCROA rose dramatically. This burgeoning membership included members of
Congress who, like Maas, were active within both the Marine Corps Reserve and civilian
government. During the Cold War, the MCROA and other pro-military special interest
groups advocated for increased military funding and for the allocation of funds to specific
services. It is important to note that while the MCROA, and other groups like it, are an
effective method for the armed services to generate political momentum, it does beg the
question of the dangers of allowing the armed services to infiltrate civilian government
with their own pro-military agenda. However, regardless of the dangers this infiltration
may potentially pose to a properly functioning democracy, it is undeniable that Maas’s
support for the modernization of the reserve forces of the United States military was of
great benefit to American defense and the American people during the time period in
which he was politically active. The Marine Corps Reserve and the foundations of the
modern American reserve system stand as a testament to Maas’s unwavering support of
not only their modernization, but to his vision of American Defense.
The Marine Corps Reserve has played and continues to play a vital role within the
Marine Corps, and the efforts of Melvin Maas needs to be better represented in the larger
narrative of American military history. The reserves afford the Marine Corps the ability
to maintain a potential force size that would be fiscally impractical otherwise, thus
granting greater strategic flexibility. This flexibility was first demonstrated in 1940 and
then again in 1950. While the conflict in Vietnam did not require the activation of a large
number of reserve units, the maintenance of reserve forces across all branches of military
service remained a key aspect to Cold War planning. It was not until the end of the Cold
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War and the outbreak of the First Gulf War that a large call up of reserve forces occurred.
The 4th Marine Division, the reserve division of the Marine Corps organized in the
1960s, was almost entirely called into service. Other reserve components of Army, Air
Force, and Navy, and the National Guard were also employed during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm. These units, which so greatly benefited from the efforts of Maas and other
pro-reserve advocates, performed their duties in a highly professional manner and in full
conjunction with their active duty counterparts. This was again the case in the Second
Gulf War in 2003. Both instances demonstrate the usefulness of properly managed
reserve forces to rapidly increase the size and projective strength of the American
military.
The 2003 conflict with Iraq proved that modernized reserve forces are also
essential to prolonged military engagements and occupations. The Marine Corps, along
with the other branches of the military, relied on reserve and guard forces to relieve their
active duty counterparts. The option presented by the modern reserve system allowed for
more rest and recuperation of active duty units and prolonged the time between
deployments for units that saw multiple rotations into country. The same can be said
about the war in Afghanistan, although not to quite the scale of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Should the nation again decide to employ its military en masse during the ongoing
War on Terror, or in another international conflict, it will more than likely call on some,
if not a large majority, of its reserve forces to project American military might. Thus, the
reserve forces of the American military are an essential aspect to future military planning
and the execution of those plans. Considering this, the development of the American
military’s reserve system is crucial to understanding the current state of military affairs.
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Furthermore, an understanding of the rise of the modern reserve system cannot be
achieved without the recognition of the contributions of Melvin J. Maas to the Marine
Corps Reserve.
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APPENDIX

Timeline of Key Marine Corps Reserve Legislation up to 1940
23 August 1892- Naval Appropriations Act (approved 19 July 1892): This act allows for
the formal creation of federally recognized Naval Militias. Seven states elect to
create a Naval Militia. A portion of those states also elect to create Marine
Militias.
12 April 1914- Navy Department General Order No. 93: Establishes a Division of Naval
Militias Affairs within the Department of the Navy.
16 February 1914- Naval Militia Act of 1914 Passed: This act hands over control of the
Naval Militias, including Marine Militias, from the individual states to the
Department of the Navy.
November 1914- First Marine Corps Reserve Unit unofficially founded: The Marine
Corps creates its first reserve unit out of the the Massachusetts Marine 1st
Company, originally a Marine Militia Unit. They do so without legislative
authority
10 July 1915- General Orders 93 and 153: Define the organization of Marine Militia
Units.
29 August 1916- Marine Corps Reserve Act Passed: Officially creates the Marine Corps
Reserve and places all of the Marine Militia Units under the control of the Corps.
This Act also creates the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps.
31 August 1916- General Order 231: Establishes the Marine Corps Reserve within the
Marine Corps.
6 April 1917- US Declaration of War against the Germany. USMC and USMCR called
into service with the AEF.
28 February 1925- Reserve Act of 1925: Replaces the Marine Corps Reserve Act of
1916.
10 November 1926- Marine Corps Reserve Officer’s Association created.
25 June 1938- Naval Reserve Act of 1938: Replaces the Reserve Act of 1925.
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8 September 1938- Limited National Emergency declared.
5 October 1940- Dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy issued. Alert for potential call
up of the Marine Reserve.
15 October 1940- Circular Letter 369 issued. All 23 reserve battalions called into active
service.

